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Essays in Corporate Finance 
 
Abstract 
Written in the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, the following essays explore the nature and 
implications of firm-level financial distress. The first essay examines the external effects of financial 
distress,  while  the  second  and  third  essays  examine  its  internal  consequences.  The  first  essay 
investigates the potential contagion effects of financial distress among retail firms using a novel 
measure of retailers’ geographic exposure to one another and, in particular, to liquidated chain stores. 
The second essay draws on new, hand-collected data on firm-level layoff instances to look into the 
ways in which financial distress impinges on firms’ employment behavior. Building on the second 
essay,  the  third  essay  considers  financial  market  reactions  to  layoff  decisions,  particularly  those 
resulting from financial strain. Each essay sheds additional light on the ways in which financial 
distress propagates through to affect the economy at large. Overall, the picture that emerges is one 
in  which  firm-level  financial  distress  appears  to  be  an  important  factor  behind  the  long  and 
protracted nature of the current economic recovery. 
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Chapter 1: Bankruptcy Externalities in Retail 2 
 
Introduction 
How  does  bankruptcy  spread?  While  research  on  bankruptcy  and  financial  distress  has 
documented  how  bankruptcy  reorganizations  affect  firms  that  go  through  Chapter-11 
reorganizations, there is limited evidence on the effect of bankruptcies and financial distress on 
competitors and industry peers.
1 In this paper, we identify a new channel through which bankrupt 
firms impose negative externalities on their non-bankrupt competitors, namely, through their impact 
on peer firm sales and on the propensity to close stores. 
Research in industrial organization has argued that the geographic concentration of stores can be 
explained  by  consumers’  imperfect  information  and  their  need  to  search  the  market  (Wolinsky 
(1983)). Consistent with theoretical predictions, empirical studies show that sales of neighboring 
stores are correlated in a manner that is consistent with the existence of positive externalities among 
them.  Such  externalities  exist  since  some  stores  –  those  of  national  name-brands  or  anchor 
department stores, in particular – draw customer traffic not only to their own stores but also to 
nearby stores. As a result, store level sales may depend on the sales of neighboring stores for reasons 
that are unrelated to local economic conditions (Gould and Pashigan (1998) and Gould, Pashigan 
and Prendergast (2005)). 
We conjecture that the externalities that exist between neighboring stores, and the economies of 
agglomeration they create, can be detrimental during downturns, propagating and amplifying the 
negative effects of financial distress and bankruptcies among firms in the same locality. Our main 
prediction  is  that,  due  to  economics  of  agglomeration,  retail  stores  in  distress  impose  negative 
externalities on their neighboring peers: store sales tend to decrease with the reduction in sales, and 
ultimately  the  closure,  of  stores  nearby.  If  such  negative  externalities  are  sufficiently  strong, 
                                                           
1 For papers that study the effect of bankruptcy on firm outcomes, see Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), 
Hotchkiss (1995), and Stromberg (2000). 3 
 
bankruptcies, and the store closure they involve, will lead to additional bankruptcies, propagating 
within a given area. 
Identifying a causal link, however, from the bankruptcy and financial distress of one retailer to 
the  sales  and  closure  decisions  of  its  neighboring  retailers  is  made  difficult  by  the  fact  that 
bankruptcy filings and financial distress are correlated with local economic conditions. Correlation in 
sales  among  stores  in  the  same  vicinity  may  therefore  simply  reflect  weak  demand  in  an  area. 
Similarly, the fact that store closures tend to cluster locally may often be the outcome of underlying 
difficulties in the local economy, rather than the effect of negative externalities among stores. Local 
economic conditions will naturally drive a correlation in outcomes among stores located in the same 
area. 
Using a novel and detailed dataset of all national chain store locations, openings, and closures 
across the United States from 2005 to 2010, we provide empirical evidence that supports the view 
that bankruptcies of retail companies impose negative externalities on neighboring stores owned by 
solvent  companies.  Our  identification  strategy  consists  of  analyzing  the  effect  of  Chapter  7 
bankruptcies of large national retailers, such as Circuit City and Linens ‘n Things, who liquidated 
their entire store chain during the sample period. Using Chapter 7 bankruptcies of national retailers 
alleviates the concern that local economic conditions led to the demise of the company: it is unlikely 
that  a  large  retail  chain  will  suffer  major  financial  difficulties  because  of  a  localized  economic 
downturn in one of its many locations. Supporting this identification assumption, we show that 
stores of retail chains that eventually end up in Chapter 7 bankruptcy are not located in areas that are 
worse than the location of stores operated by chains that do not end up in bankruptcy, along a host 
of economic characteristics. 
Using detailed data on store locations, we show that stores located in proximity to stores of 
national chains that are liquidated are more likely to close, and, further, that new stores are unlikely 4 
 
to  open  in  these  areas.  We  also  study  the  interaction  between  the  geographical  effect  of  store 
closures and the financial health of solvent owners of neighboring stores. We hypothesize that the 
impact of national chain store liquidations will be stronger on firms in weaker financial health, as 
these stores are expected to suffer more from the reduction in customer traffic. Focusing on stores 
owned by a parent company, and measuring financial health using the profitability of the parent, we 
find consistent with our hypothesis that the geographical effect of store closures on neighboring 
stores is indeed more pronounced in financially weaker firms. 
Next, we turn to analyze the aggregated firm-level effects of bankrupt store closures. While the 
fine resolution of store-level analysis enables us to better identify localized effects and control for 
unobserved localized geographic heterogeneity, it is unclear whether the localized effects aggregate 
up in a meaningful way to firm-level outcomes. To this end, we run firm-level regressions examining 
the effect of the level of firm exposure to neighboring national-chain store closures on various firm-
level outcomes. We find that the impact of store closures does indeed aggregate to the firm level. 
Increases in the exposure to neighboring store closures is associated with reduced firm-level sales as 
well as a reduction in the number of stores under operation. 
Related Literature 
This  paper  is  related  to  a  broad  literature  on  the  competitive  behavior  of  firms,  including 
product market competition, price setting behavior, firms’ location preferences and entry and exit 
decisions. We focus on entry and exit decisions, in particular – the strategic openings and closures of 
individual retail stores in response to neighboring competitors. 
The literature on spatial competition extends back to Hotelling (1929). According to Hotelling’s 
model, firms co-locate in order to attract consumers who travel to the nearest firm. The classic 
example is ice cream vendors locating near one another on a beach, which extends to the tendency 
for retailers to co-locate in shopping centers and malls. There are other explanations for co-location. 5 
 
From  the  supply  side,  firms’  location  choices  may  create  competitive  advantages  by  improving 
access to key resources (such as skilled labor or suppliers), reducing input costs or benefiting from 
knowledge spill-over (Marshall (1920)). From the demand side, firms co-locate to attract consumers, 
who are often concentrated. 
Our  analysis  relies  on  the  existence  of  economies  of  agglomeration.  Evidence  for  this  is 
provided in Gould and Pashigan (1998) and Gould, Pashigan and Prendergast (2005) who show that 
anchor stores in malls create positive externalities on other non-anchor stores by attracting customer 
traffic. Mall owners internalize this externality by providing rent subsidies to anchor stores. Indeed, 
the rent subsidy provided to anchor stores as compared to non-anchor stores – estimated at no less 
than 72 percent  – suggests that these positive externalities are economically large. 
Previous  studies  have  related  entry  and  exit  behavior  to  the  intensity  of  product  market 
competition.  Chevalier  (1995a)  establishes  an  empirical  link  between  firm  capital  structure  and 
product-market competition using data from local supermarket competition and, more specifically, 
the  entry  and  exit  behavior  of  chains  surrounding  leveraged  buyouts  (LBOs).  An  event-study 
analysis suggests that an LBO announcement increases the market value of the LBO chain’s local 
competitors. In addition, supermarket chains were more likely to enter and expand in local markets 
in which a large share of the incumbent firms in the local market undertook leveraged buyouts. 
Overall, the study suggests that leverage increases in the late 1980s led to softer product market 
competition, which in turn encouraged the entry of competitors. 
Kovenock  and  Phillips  (1995)  present  evidence  on  the  link  between  capital  structure  and 
product market competition that is consistent with the LBO analysis in Chevalier (1995a). They 
study the relationship between product market rivalry and capital structure using data on capital 
structure decisions and product market behavior from the U.S. Census. They find that firms are 
more likely to recapitalize when they have individual plants of low productivity and operate in a 6 
 
highly concentrated industry. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) add to Kovenock and Phillips (1995) by 
considering  how  leverage  recapitalization  affects  individual  firm  investment  and  plant  closure 
decisions  across  ten  different  industries.  They  find  that,  in  highly  concentrated  markets,  high 
leverage appears to decrease firm-level investment and increase plant closures.  
According to theoretical predictions, an increase in leverage creates incentives to raise product 
prices, which will in turn affect entry and exit behavior. While Chevalier (1995a) looks at local 
product market competition through entry and exit following LBO announcements, the study does 
not contain evidence on price changes. Chevalier (1995b) studies prices changes within supermarkets 
across a variety of local markets, using firm-level prices to study price differences between LBO and 
non-LBO firms. The study finds evidence that prices rise following LBOs in local markets in which 
the LBO firm’s competitors are also highly leveraged. In these contexts, the LBO firms tend to have 
higher prices than non-LBO firms, suggesting that LBOs tend to induce price increases. However, 
the study finds that prices tend to fall following LBOs in local markets in which the LBO firm’s 
competitors have relatively low leverage, where these price drops are associated with the LBO firm 
leaving the market. 
There have been several other empirical studies on price competition. Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1995) find that industries in which a relatively large fraction of output is produced by small firms 
tend to have more counter-cyclical price markups (after controlling for total market concentration). 
The underlying idea is that small firms should be more strapped for cash during recessions, since 
smaller firms have more restricted access to capital markets in general. As a consequence, they are 
predicted to forgo investment in customer loyalty in these periods and raise prices. 
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) consider pricing within supermarkets along another angle. They 
focus on price changes in states hit hard by the oil-price decline of 1986. They ask whether, within 
these oil states, supermarkets belonging to national chains (and thus able rely to a greater extent on 7 
 
external financing) lowered their prices relative to local supermarkets, who were presumably more 
strapped for cash. They find this to be the case, suggesting that national supermarkets were more 
willing to invest in customers because they had lower discount rates as a result of easier access to 
external financing. 
There have been few studies analyzing how firms in bankruptcy or financial distress affect their 
industry peers. One exception is Benmelech and Bergman (2011) who use data from the airline 
industry to examine how firms in financial distress impose negative externalities on their industry 
peers. This negative externality arises in the form of an increase in the cost of capital of peer firms 
using  the  same  type  of  collateral  as  those  firms  entering  distress.  This  collateral  channel  thus 
provides a different mechanism than that studied in this paper through which financial distress can 
propagate and be amplified through the economy. 
Identification Strategy 
Our main prediction is that, due to economics of agglomeration, the closure of retail stores 
imposes negative externalities on their neighbors – that is, store sales tend to decrease with a decline 
in  customer  traffic  in  their  area.  If  this  effect  is  sufficiently  large,  store  closures  will  tend  to 
propagate  geographically.  However,  identifying  a  causal  link  from  the  financial  distress  or 
bankruptcy of retailers to the decision of a neighboring solvent retailer to close its stores is difficult 
because financial distress is potentially correlated with underlying local economic conditions. For 
example, the fact that local retailers are in financial distress can convey information about weak local 
demand. Similarly, the fact that store closures tend to cluster locally does not imply in and of itself a 
causal link but rather may simply reflect difficulties in the local economy.  
Our identification strategy consists of analyzing the effect of Chapter 7 bankruptcies of large 
national retailers, such as Circuit City and Linens ‘n Things, who liquidate their entire store chain 
during the sample period. Using Chapter 7 bankruptcies of national retailers alleviates the concern 8 
 
that local economic conditions led to the demise of the company: it is unlikely that a large retail 
chain will suffer major financial difficulties because of a localized economic downturn in one of its 
many locations. Still, it is likely that national chains experiencing financial distress will restructure 
their operations and cherry-pick those stores they would like to remain open. According to this, 
financially distressed retailers will shut down their worst performing stores while keeping their best 
stores open, implying that a correlation between closures of stores of bankrupt chains may merely 
reflect poor local demand rather than negative externalities driven by financial distress. We address 
this  concern  directly  by  only  utilizing  variation  driven  by  bankruptcy  cases  that  result  in  the 
liquidation of the entire chain. In these cases, there is clearly no concern of cherry-picking of the 
more successful stores; all stores are closed regardless of local demand conditions. 
In  examining  national  chain  liquidations,  one  concern  that  remains  is  that  the  stores  of  the 
liquidating chain were located in areas that experienced negative economic shocks – for example, 
because of poor store placement decisions made on the part of headquarters – and that it was these 
shocks that eventually drove the chain into bankruptcy. In fact, this turns out not to be the case: we 
show empirically that stores of chains that eventually file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy are not located in 
areas that are worse than the location of stores operated by chains that do not end up in bankruptcy, 
along a host of economic characteristics such as median household income, house value, and the 
percent of population in poverty. 
Data and Summary Statistics 
Sample Construction and Data Sources 
Our dataset is composed of several sources, each described in turn in this section. The main 
source is Chain Store Guide (CSG) a dataset of retail chain stores across the United States, in which 
each individual store is described by the name of the chain that it belongs to and by its street address. 
The data is organized in annual snapshots from 2005 through 2010. We link store chain names to 9 
 
their parent company owners and rely on the parent company names to incorporate other sources of 
firm-level data, such as SDC and Compustat. Lastly, we gather demographic data from a variety of 
sources, including the Census, the BLS, the IRS and Zillow.  
Chain Store Guide 
Chain Store Guide (CSG) is a trade publication devoted to trends facing retail and wholesale 
chain  stores.  It  provides  store  location  data  on  major  retailers,  restaurants,  distributors  and 
wholesalers in the Unites States and Canada.
2 We obtained access from CSG on apparel and general 
merchandise chain stores between 2005 and 2010. The variables included in the data are; (1) 
company name; (2) store phone number, and (3) store address (street number, street name, city, state 
and zip code). In its raw form, CSG contained 829,747 observations spanning the years 2005-2010, 
spread across 51 unique states (including Washington D.C.). 
The unique company identifier in the CSG data is company  name, which we clean and organize 
for consistency, resulting in 10,370 unique company names, with large chain stores accounting for 
the bulk of the data. For example, in 2010, the 75 largest chain stores accounted for  108,099 of the 
166,032 stores in the dataset, representing 65.1 of the stores in the data for that year. 
SDC Platinum 
We use SDC Platinum to identify retail bankruptcies since January 2000 within the following 
SIC retail trade categories: general merchandise (SIC 4-digit codes 5311, 5331 and 5399), apparel 
(5600, 5621 and 5651), home furnishings (5700, 5712, 5731, 5734 and 5735) and miscellaneous 
(5900,  5912,  5940,  5944,  5945,  5960,  5961  and  5990).  There  are  93  cases  of  retail  bankruptcy 
between 2000 and 2011. The largest bankruptcies in recent years include Anchor Blue Retail Group, 
Blockbuster,  Borders  Group,  Boscov’s  Department  Store,  Circuit  City,  Filene’s  Basement, 
                                                           
2 The data is typically used by manufacturers, suppliers, service providers, real estate professionals, retailers, analysts and 
consultants in the retail and foodservice markets. 10 
 
Gottschalks, Hancock Fabrics, Jennifer Convertibles, Linens ‘n Things, Mervyn’s and the Movie 
Gallery. Table 1 summarizes Chapter 7 bankruptcies from 2003 through 2011. 
Table 1: Retail Bankruptcies from 2003-2011 
 
Compustat Fundamental and Industry Data 
Next,  we  match  the  CSG  data  to  Compustat  Fundamental  and  Industry  Data.  We  use  the 
Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual and Quarterly databases to construct variables 
that are based on operational and financial data. These include the number of employees in the firm, 
size  (defined  as  the  natural  log  of  total  assets),  the  level  of  investment  (defined  as  capital 
expenditures divided by the lagged value of property, plant and equipment), the level of inventories, 
the ratio of investment to capital, the market-to-book ratio (defined as the market value of equity 
and  book  value  of  assets  less  the  book  value  of  equity,  divided  by  the  book  value  of  assets), 
profitability (defined as earnings over total assets), leverage (defined as total current liabilities plus 
long-term  debt,  divided  by  the  book  value  of  assets),  liquidity  (defined  as  net  income  plus 
depreciation and amortization, divided by the lagged value of property, plant and equipment) and 
sales revenue (defined as total sales). Appendix A provides a complete description of the variables 
used in the paper and their construction. 
Year
Number of 
Bankruptcies
Sum of Assets at Initial 
Filings (USD $mm)
Average Assets at Initial 
Filings  (USD $mm)
Sum of Liabilities at Initial 
Filings (USD $mm)
Average Liabilities at Initial 
Filings (USD $mm)
2011 2 $ 216.96 $ 108.48 $ 229.34 $ 114.67
2010 2 $ 51.38 $ 25.69 $ 77.77 $ 38.89
2009 12 $ 2473.7 $ 206.14 $ 2472.32 $ 206.03
2008 22 $ 6906.81 $ 313.95 $ 7073.88 $ 321.54
2007 5 $ 679.96 $ 135.99 $ 499.58 $ 99.92
2006 3 $ 48.88 $ 16.29 $ 218.71 $ 72.9
2005 3 $ 460.75 $ 153.58 $ 302.92 $ 100.97
2004 7 $ 1404.46 $ 200.64 $ 917.69 $ 131.1
2003 7 $ 1898.52 $ 271.22 $ 2005.1 $ 286.44
This table summarizes bankruptcies within the following SIC retail trade categories: general merchandise (SIC 4-digit codes 5311, 5331 and 
5399), apparel (5600, 5621 and 5651), home furnishings (5700, 5712, 5731, 5734 and 5735) and miscellaneous (5900, 5912, 5940, 5944, 
5945, 5960, 5961 and 5990). Dollar figures are in millions.11 
 
We  supplement  the  financial  information  with  retail  industry  specific  variables  from  the 
Compustat North America Industry Specific Annual and Quarterly databases. These include the net 
sales per retail square foot, the minimum rental expense, the number of stores opened during the 
period, the number of stores at the period’s end, the number of stores closed during the period, the 
percentage change in comparable sales, other rental expenses and the total retail square footage. 
Next we supplement the data with information pertaining to the local economies from the Census, 
the IRS, Zillow and the BLS. 
Census Data 
We rely on the Census 2000 survey for a host of demographic variables available by zip code. 
These include population and population density, gender, age, race, household size and number of 
households,  marital  status,  educational  attainment,  employment  status,  median  and  average 
household income, number of housing units, occupancy and vacancy rates, median house value, 
median rent, portion of housing units financed with a mortgage, second mortgage or home equity 
loan, and portion of the population living in poverty.  
IRS 
Since income data is unavailable in the Census 2010 survey, we turn instead to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS provides the number of filed tax returns (a proxy for the number of 
households), the number of exemptions (a proxy for the population), adjusted gross income (which 
includes taxable income from all sources less adjustments such as IRA deductions, self-employment 
taxes, health insurance, alimony paid, etc.), wage and salary income, dividend income and interest 
income. 
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Zillow 
We use data on house prices from Zillow, an online real estate database that tracks valuations 
throughout the United States. We collect estimated house value and address including city, state and 
zip code. We then map zip codes to counties to obtain county-level median house values. 
State GDP and Unemployment Data 
Lastly, we collect GDP and unemployment data from 2000 to 2009 for all states from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Summary Statistics 
Table  2  provides  summary  statistics  of  zip  code  characteristics  for  the  816,648  store-year 
observations in our final dataset. Summary statistics are calculated over the entire sample and are 
therefore weighted by the number of store-year observation in each zip code. As the table shows, 
total population in zip codes that correspond to store locations was 27,864.5 in the year 2000, with a 
population density of 2,617 residents per square mile. Population between the ages of 18 and 55 
accounted  for 53.6 of the  total  population with a standard deviation of 0.063,  while the  mean 
population  under  18,  and  over  55  account  for  0.248  and  0.217,  respectively.  According  to  the 
Census, 0.784 of the population was classified as white and 0.111 as black. The number of house 
holds within a zip code was on average 10,624.7 (median 10,165) and the average household size was 
2.55 with a standard deviation of 0.359. 
Turning to information about the education characteristics of the zip codes in which the stores 
are located – 27.8 percent of the residents had at least a high school education, while 28.1 percent 
had some college education, 16.9 percent had bachelor degrees, and the fractions of residents with 
masters or professional degrees were 6.3 and 2.1 percent, respectively. Finally, the median household 
income in 2000 was $49,016 and about 10 percent of the population was living in poverty in the year 
2000 according to the Census classification. The median house price was $257,514 but ranged from 13 
 
a 25
th percentile of $138,536 to a 75
th percentile of $317,273 with a standard deviation of $184,613. 
Finally, the median house price in the counties where stores are located appreciated by 62.0 percent 
from 2002 to 2006, ranging from a 25
th percentile of 26.8% to the 75
th percentile of median house 
price growth of 90.9%. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the demongraphic variables used in the empirical analysis.
Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Standard 
deviation
Population
   Total population 27,864.5 16,292.0 26,142.0 37,097.0 15,944.6
   Population density 2,617.0 276.2 1,238.8 3,000.4 6,007.9
   Population under 18 0.248 0.222 0.250 0.277 0.051
   Population between 18 and 55 0.536 0.500 0.530 0.564 0.063
   Population over 55 0.217 0.172 0.214 0.254 0.071
   Population white 0.784 0.699 0.841 0.925 0.190
   Population black 0.111 0.014 0.044 0.130 0.163
   Average household size 2.55 2.35 2.52 2.71 0.36
   Number of households 10,624.7 6,384.0 10,165.0 14,268.0 5,816.8
Education
   Less than high school 0.177 0.101 0.157 0.234 0.103
   High school 0.279 0.218 0.283 0.339 0.087
   Some college 0.281 0.242 0.282 0.322 0.060
   Bachelor degree 0.169 0.100 0.149 0.225 0.087
   Master degree 0.063 0.033 0.052 0.083 0.041
   Professional degree 0.021 0.010 0.015 0.025 0.020
Income and house prices
   Living in poverty, 2000 0.103 0.051 0.086 0.136 0.072
   Median household income, 2000 49,016.4 37,141.0 46,038.0 58,298.0 16,654.7
   Median house price 257,513.5 138,536.0 205,703.0 317,273.0 184,613.3
   Median house price growth, 2002-2006 62.04% 26.76% 57.18% 90.86% 42.22%
Panel A: Zip-code characteristics: 2005-2010 (816,748 store-year observations)14 
 
Store Opening and Closures 
A comparison of the data from one year to the next enables us to infer store openings and 
closings, summarized by year in Table 3. We define a store opening if an entry appears in a given 
year but not in the preceding one. Similarly, we define a store closure if an entry appears in a given 
year but not in the subsequent one. From 2006 to 2010, we observe 121,261 chain store openings, 
the peak year being 2006. From 2005-2009, we observe 440315 closures, the peak year being 2008.
3  
Table 3: Store Openings and Closures Over Time 
 
Empirical Analysis 
The Initial Locations of Liquidated Chain Stores 
The main idea of our identification strategy is that large bankruptcies of national retail chains are 
less likely to be driven by local economic conditions if their stores are diversified geographically but 
are rather driven by bad strategy or business plan that is unrelated to the location of their stores. For 
our identification strategy to be valid, we first need to show that the initial locations of stores of 
retail chains that will eventually end-up bankrupt are not in zip codes that are worse in terms of their 
economic characteristics than those locations of stores operated by chains that do not end up in 
bankruptcy. In order to estimate the relation between local economic conditions and the location of 
                                                           
3 Note that given the nature of the data, we can define store openings starting in 2006 and store closings up to 2009. 
Year Number of store openings Number of store closures Total number of stores (at year end)
2005 -- 4,013 84,388
2006 45,582 10,673 125,896
2007 32,326 1,994 147,550
2008 2,146 16,365 148,432
2009 23,297 7,270 155,113
2010 17,865 -- 165,770
121,216 40,315 742,761
This table summarizes the numbers of individual store openings and closures between 2005 and 2010. We define a 
store opening if an entry appears in a given year but not in the preceding one. Similarly, we define a store closure if an 
entry appears in a given year but not in the subsequent one. Given the nature of the data, we can define store openings 
starting in 2006 and store closures up to 2009.15 
 
stores  of  national  retail  chains  that  end  up  in  liquidation,  we  run  a  probit  model  where  the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a store operated by a national retail chain that 
will end up in liquidation by the end of the year, and zero otherwise. As explanatory variables we 
include the 2000 Census socio-demographic controls, 2-digit retail industry fixed-effects and state 
fixed-effects. Table 4 reports the coefficients on four of the leading economic indicators that are 
based on the income and housing data; the log of the median household income in 2000; the log of 
the median house value in 2000; the fraction of the population living in poverty; and median house 
price growth during the period 2002-2006. We run the regression separately for stores that are 
located in shopping malls and “stand-alone” stores not in shopping malls. Table 4 reports the results 
from estimating different variants of the model. The table displays marginal effects computed based 
on the probit estimation and standard errors (in parentheses) that are clustered at the zip code level 
throughout the paper. 
As the first column of Table 4 demonstrates, “stand-alone” stores of national retail chains that 
end-up  in  liquidation  after  the  year  2006  are  located  in  zip-codes  with  socio-demographic 
characteristics that are not statistically different from zip codes in which other stores are located. 
None of the four variables reported in the first column of Table 4 are significant statistically or have 
meaningful economic magnitudes. The second column of the table compares liquidated chain stores 
that are located in shopping malls to other stores located in shopping malls. The results indicate that, 
if anything, stores of liquidated chains are located in zip codes with slightly higher median household 
income that stores of chains that do end up in liquidation. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis in 
Columns  1  and  2  for  new  store  openings  during  the  year  2005.  Consistent  with  our  previous 
findings, stores of retail chains that will end up in liquidation are located in zip codes that are similar 
to the  locations of other stores in terms of median house  value,  poverty rate  and house  price 
appreciation. As in Column 2, the only difference between the locations of liquidated chain stores 16 
 
and the location of other stores is that stores of liquidated chains are located in zip codes with 
slightly higher median household income. As the coefficients on log(median household income) 
imply,  liquidated  chain  stores  are  located  in  zip  codes  with  median  household  income  that  is 
between 0.2% and 1.3% higher than in the location of other stores. Finally, in the last two columns 
of Table 4 we study the location of stores of liquidated chain stores by including zip-code fixed-
effects. We pool together all stores in the data for both years 2005 and 2006 and study separately the 
location decisions of “stand alone” liquidated chain stores (Column 5) and liquidated chain stores 
that  are  located  in  shopping  malls  (Column  6).  The  inclusion  of  zip-code  level  fixed-effects 
difference  out  the  time-invariant  zip-code  level  socio-demographic  variables.  The  only  zip-code 
characteristic that is time-varying is log(median house value) which we obtain from Zillow. As Table 
4 demonstrates, there is no statistically significant difference between house values in zip codes 
where liquidated chain stores are located compared to other stores. 
In summary, Table 4 demonstrates that there are no significant differences between the location 
of liquidated chain stores and other stores. Moreover, the only slight differences in terms of location 
is that liquidated chain stores are more likely to be located in zip codes with slightly higher median 
household income. These results confirm that the initial location of stores of national chains that 
end up in liquidation is not a likely cause of their failure and thus closure of these stores is unlikely 
to be driven by worse local economic conditions. 
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Table 4: Big Bankruptcies, Store Locations and Openings 
 
Store-level Analysis: The Effect of Bankruptcy on Store Closures 
We  begin  with  a  simple  test  of  the  negative  externalities  hypothesis  by  estimating  a  linear 
probability model of store closures conditional on the liquidation of local stores that result from a 
national retailer bankruptcy. We define local stores as stores that are: (1) located in the same address; 
(2) stores that are located in a different address and are located with a 50 meters radius; (3) stores 
that are located in a different address and are located in a radius of more than 50 meters but less or 
equal than 100 meters; and (4) stores that are located in a different address but within a radius of 
more than 100 meters but less than 250 meters. The number of stores in proximity to bankrupt 
chains is described by year in Table 5. The greatest exposure to bankrupt chains occurs in 2008, with 
9,155 stores sharing the addresses of bankrupt chains. In the same year, 5,921 stores had locations 
within 50 meters of bankrupt chain stores, 4,111 stores had locations within 50 to 100 meters and 
8,700 stores had locations within 100 to 250 meters. 
 
 
Location Location Opening Opening Location Location
Log(median household income) 0.001 0.011 * 0.013 *** 0.002 *
0.003 0.007 0.005 0.001
Log(median house value) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.011
0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.010
Living in poverty -0.001 -0.022 0.010 -0.004
0.013 0.025 0.022 0.005
Median house price growth, 2002-2006 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.001
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001
Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2005-2006 2005-2006
2000 Census zip code controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
State fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Zip code fixed-effects No No No No Yes Yes
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mall? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of zip codes 5,896 2,446 1,810 1,465 6,555 2,551
Observations 28,040 18,658 4,692 7,657 73,347 31,542
Estimation Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS
Adjusted R
2 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.36 0.04 0.0318 
 
Table 5: Number of Stores in Proximity to Big Bankruptcies 
 
Table 6 presents the results from estimating a linear probability model in which the dependent 
variable equals one  if a  store  is closed, and zero otherwise.
4 As explanatory variables  we use a 
dummy for whether the store belongs to a bankrupt company, a dummy for whe ther the store is 
located in a shopping mall, time-variant zip-code characteristics that include the log of median house 
value, and the annual change in the median house value, state -level time-variant economic variables 
including log(income per capita) and annual income growth and firm -level characteristics t hat 
include size (defined as the natural log of total assets ), leverage (defined as total current liabilities 
plus long-term debt, divided by the book value of assets) and profitability (defined as earnings over 
total assets). 
We investigate the transmission of the negative externalities that are imposed by bankruptcies of 
neighboring store further by studying the joint impact of the firm financial health and neighboring 
store closures on the likelihood that a firm will close its own store. We hypothesize that the effect of 
neighboring store closures on the likelihood that a store will close should be larger for firms with 
low profitability. Less profitable firms are more likely to be in financial distress, making them more 
                                                           
4 We employ a liner probability model instead of probit because of the incidental parameters problem that results from 
the saturation of the model with many fixed-effects. 
Year 0m 50m 50m - 100m 100m - 250m
2005 211 310 117 330
2006 3,876 1,096 656 1,511
2007 2,142 579 349 860
2008 9,155 5,921 4,111 8,700
2009 1,869 1,623 1,162 2,823
This table summarizes the number of stores in proximity to big bankruptcies using four distance measures:
(1) located in the same address (0m), (2) located at a different address and within 50 meter radius, (3)
located at a different address and within a radius of more than 50 meters but less than or equal to 100
meters, and (4) located at a different address and within a radius of more than 100 meters but less than or
equal to 250 meters.
Number of stores within range of a big bankruptcy19 
 
vulnerable  to  a  decline  in  demand  that  is  driven  by  other  stores  closing  down.  We  therefore 
introduce an interaction variable between profitability and each of the local store closures into the 
specification estimated in the regressions that are reported in Table 6. We run the analysis separately 
with different fixed-effects to control for geographic heterogeneity. Column 1 includes the zip code 
fixed-effects while Column 2 include instead county fixed-effects, while Columns 3 and 4 each 
control for state, and Census division fixed-effects. All the specifications include year fixed-effects 
and standard errors are clustered at the zip-code level. 
As Table 6 demonstrates, bankrupt retailers are between 2.7 and 3.5 percentage points more 
likely to close their stores, representing an increase of approximately 44 to 57 percent relative to the 
mean. Moreover, during the period studied stores that are located in a mall were more likely to close 
down than “stand alone” stores. Larger retailers are less likely to close their stores, while more 
leveraged and less profitable retailers are more likely to close their stores. The evidence that is based 
on these firm characteristic is consistent with the conjecture that the financial health of the firm is an 
important determinant of whether stores stay open or are closed down. 
Moving to the effect of local store closures on the likelihood that a store will be closed down we 
find evidence that supports our hypothesis that local store closures impose negative externalities on 
other  retailers  in  the  area.  We  find  that  local  store  closures  in  the  same  address  increase  the 
likelihood that a store will close down by 2.1 percentage points, representing an increase of  34 
percent relative to the mean. Likewise, store closing in a different address but within a 50 meters 
radius further increase the likelihood of store closure by 2.5 percentage points, representing an 
increase of 41 percent relative to the unconditional mean. Finally, we do not find a significant effect 
of stores closures that are more than 50 meters away. 
Consistent with the prediction of the joint effect of financial distress and store closures, we find 
that  the  effect  of  local  store  closing  is  amplified  when  the  retailer  operating  the  store  under 20 
 
investigation is in financial distress. As can be seen in Table 6, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between same address and profitability is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level 
(the effect ranges from 0.099 to 0.100 with a standard error of 0.024). Local store closures increase 
the likelihood that a store with a low profitability parent will close by 9.9 to 10.0 percentage points, 
which represents an increase of 162 to 164 percent relative to the unconditional mean. Likewise, the 
coefficient  on  the  interaction  tern  between  distance <= 50 meters  and  profitability  is  negative  and 
statistically significant at the one percent level (the effect ranges from 0.157 to 0.160 with standard 
errors between 0.039 and 0.04). These magnitudes indicate that local store closures increase the 
likelihood that a store with a low profitability parent will close by 15.7 to 16.0 percentage points, 
which represents an increase of 257 to 262 percent relative to the unconditional mean. 
To summarize so far, our results are consistent with the notion that the effect of the externalities 
imposed by local store closures exist and hat they are more pronounced for firms that less profitable 
and more leveraged. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Bankruptcy on Store Closures 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bankrupt stores
Same address 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
x Profitability -0.099 *** -0.100 *** -0.099 *** -0.100 ***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Distance ≤ 50 meters 0.025 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.022 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
x Profitability -0.160 *** -0.157 *** -0.158 *** -0.158 ***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
50 meters < distance ≤ 100 meters -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
x Profitability 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.012
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
100 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
x Profitability -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Bankruptcy -0.027 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.035 **
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Mall 0.007 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.049 *** 0.047 *** 0.047 *** 0.047 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profitability -0.021 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.018 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(median house value) -0.006 -0.007 * 0.004 * 0.004 *
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Median house value change -0.004 -0.003 -0.013 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log(income per capita) -0.072 *** 0.017 * 0.006 0.005
(0.023) (0.009) (0.005) (0.050)
Income growth 0.079 0.009 0.000 -0.008
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip code fixed-effects Yes No No No
County fixed-effects No Yes No No
State fixed-effects No No Yes No
Census division fixed-effects No No No Yes
Observations 305,394 305,394 305,394 305,394
Adjusted R
2 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.22 
 
Store-level Analysis: The Effect of Bankruptcy on Store Openings 
We now turn to test the effect of the negative externalities hypothesis by estimating the effect of 
closures of local stores of bankrupt national chains on the likelihood that new stores will open in 
their vicinity. As before we employ a linear probability model and use the same control variables as 
in the regressions reported in the previous section. 
Table 7 presents the results from estimating a linear probability model in which the dependent 
variable equals one if a new store is opened, and zero otherwise. Similar to our previous results, we 
investigate  the  transmission  of  the  negative  externalities  that  are  imposed  by  bankruptcies  of 
neighboring stores further by studying the joint impact of the firm’s financial health and neighboring 
store closures on the likelihood that a firm will open a new store. The results reported in Table 7 
show that bankrupt retailers are between 14.9 and 16.3 percentage points less likely to open new 
stores stores, representing a decrease of 90 to 100 percent relative to the mean. Moreover, new 
stores are more likely to be opened in shopping malls. Turning to firm characteristics, we find that 
larger retailers are more likely to open news stores, while more profitable retailers are less likely to 
open new stores. 
We find that local store closures in the same address decrease the likelihood that a store will be 
opened by between 1.3 and 2.0 percentage points, representing an increase of 21 to 33 percent 
relative to the mean. Likewise, a store closure in a different address but within a 50-meter radius 
further decreases the likelihood of a store opening by between 2.3 and 2.7 percentage points. Unlike 
in Table 6, we find that local store closures have an effect on the likelihood of new stores opening 
even for closures that are further away – between 50 and 100 meters and between 100 and 250 
meters from the location of the store. Finally, as in our analysis in Table 6, we find that more 
profitable firms are less affected in their decisions to open new stores by local store closures. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Bankruptcy on Store Openings 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bankrupt stores
Same address -0.020 *** -0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
x Profitability 0.226 *** 0.241 *** 0.244 *** 0.242 ***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Distance ≤ 50 meters -0.027 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.023 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
x Profitability 0.148 *** 0.165 *** 0.163 *** 0.161 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
50 meters < distance ≤ 100 meters -0.023 *** -0.020 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
x Profitability 0.083 *** 0.094 *** 0.094 *** 0.091 ***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
100 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters -0.036 *** -0.030 *** -0.029 *** -0.029 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
x Profitability 0.146 *** 0.155 *** 0.153 *** 0.153 ***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Bankruptcy -0.149 *** -0.163 *** -0.162 *** -0.163 ***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Mall 0.060 *** 0.069 *** 0.067 *** 0.066 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Size -0.013 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Leverage 0.165 *** 0.148 *** 0.145 *** 0.145 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Profitability -0.145 *** -0.169 *** -0.170 *** -0.169 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(median house value) 0.014 0.009 0.029 *** 0.025 ***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Median house value change -0.061 *** -0.060 *** -0.077 *** -0.068 ***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
Log(income per capita) -0.008 0.018 0.003 0.004
(0.048) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007)
Income growth 0.105 * 0.086 0.146 *** 0.123 ***
(0.062) (0.053) (0.043) (0.042)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip code fixed-effects Yes No No No
County fixed-effects No Yes No No
State fixed-effects No No Yes No
Census division fixed-effects No No No Yes
Observations 262,395 262,395 262,395 262,395
Adjusted R
2 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.24 
 
Firm-level Analysis: The Effect of Local Store Closures on Firm Performance 
Our analysis so far has focused on store-level outcomes such as store closures or openings. 
While the fine resolution of store-level analysis enables us to better identify localized effects and 
control for unobserved localized geographic heterogeneity, it is not clear whether the localized effect 
aggregates up in a meaningful way to have an effect on firm-level outcomes. In this part of the paper, 
we investigate the overall effect of firm-level exposure to neighboring stores closing on firm-level 
measures of store performance and profitability. 
We  begin  by  aggregating-up  store  “exposure”  by  summing-up  the  overall  number  of  store 
closures by liquidated national chains to which the individual stores of specific retailers are exposed. 
Table 8 presents summary statistics of store closures among the liquidated chains.  
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Bankrupt Chain Store Closures 
 
Using the Compustat Fundamental and Industry data, we construct two dependent variables: (1) 
the total number of store closures during the year; and (2) the annual percentage change in firm 
revenue. Table 9 reports the results from estimating the effect of exposure to a local store closure on 
total store closures by the firm. The sample includes 96 individual retailers over the years 2005-2010 
with a total of 401 firm-year observations. All regressions are estimated with year fixed-effects and 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. As Table 9 demonstrates and consistent with the results in 
Table 6, exposure to local store closing aggregates up into a meaningful effect on store closures. 
 
Year Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Standard 
deviation
2005 48.0 21.0 33.0 90.0 36.0
2006 84.6 18.0 26.0 88.0 117.6
2007 40.0 3.5 26.0 76.5 48.9
2008 102.0 1.0 25.0 125.0 169.7
2009 498.0 44.0 316.0 1156.0 541.0
This table presents summary statistics of firm-level store closures by chains that went bankrupt 
the period.25 
 
Table 9: Firm-Level OLS Regressions, Store Closures 
 
Table 10 further investigates the aggregate effect of local store closures by conditioning the 
effect on the financial health of the firm. As demonstrated in the interaction term between the 
measures of store closures and firm profitability, the effect of local store closures is stronger for less 
profitable firms. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bankrupt stores
Same address 14.170 ***
(3.516)
Distance ≤ 50 meters 16.576 ***
(3.787)
50 meters < distance ≤ 100 meters 21.427 ***
(5.326)
100 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters 17.259 ***
(4.429)
0 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters 13.749 ***
(3.380)
Bankruptcy 72.667 *** 70.742 *** 60.589 *** 54.511 *** 59.887 ***
(10.541) (11.217) (12.083) (13.685) (12.374)
Market-to-Book -10.208 ** -10.988 ** -11.347 ** -12.256 ** -11.996 **
-(2.250) (4.714) (4.788) (4.976) (4.771)
Profitability -77.609 * -68.192 -77.076 * -67.544 -75.357 *
(43.218) (44.633) (42.659) (43.739) (44.037)
Leverage -7.378 -7.240 -11.769 -8.110 -8.536
(27.600) (28.529) (27.082) (28.667) (27.674)
Liquidity 14.353 41.094 37.342 40.549 31.148
(27.247) (31.313) (29.228) (32.074) (29.693)
Size 4.803 3.416 3.000 2.189 3.129
(3.258) (3.509) (3.509) (3.802) (3.529)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
Number of Firms 96 96 96 96 96
Adjusted R
2 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.26 
 
Table 10: Firm-Level OLS Regressions, Store Closures and Profitability 
 
Next, we analyze the effect of store closures on the annual percentage change in firm revenue. 
We regress the change in firm revenue on each of the measures of exposure to local store closures as 
well as on a dummy indicating whether the firm is in bankruptcy proceedings, and controls for 
market-to-book, profitability, leverage, liquidity and firm size. As Table 11 demonstrates, exposure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bankrupt stores
Same address 23.212 ***
(5.959)
x Profitability -50.693 ***
(19.240)
Distance ≤ 50 meters 25.484 ***
(6.900)
x Profitability -51.449 ***
(23.039)
50 meters < distance ≤ 100 meters 30.959 ***
(8.542)
x Profitability -58.499 **
(26.289)
100 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters 22.958 ***
(6.569)
x Profitability 36.617 *
(18.586)
0 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters 18.979 ***
(5.105)
x Profitability -31.251 **
14.611
Bankruptcy 82.392 *** 77.847 *** 61.184 *** 53.507 *** 59.319 ***
(8.237) (9.251) (11.389) (13.897) (12.496)
Market-to-Book -5.849 -8.673 * -9.538 ** -10.636 ** -9.328 **
(4.323) (4.447) (4.487) (4.790) (4.606)
Profitability -14.646 -11.197 -13.507 -13.116 -14.384
(41.906) (46.455) (46.040) (47.276) (47.490)
Leverage -5.692 6.786 -11.327 -8.533 -8.416
(26.434) (27.652) (26.236) (28.105) (26.983)
Liquidity 10.171 33.961 32.125 35.590 26.750
(28.062) (32.138) (30.201) (33.040) (30.657)
Size 3.685 2.766 2.454 1.911 2.544
(3.403) (3.610) (3.592) (3.842) (3.632)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
Number of Firms 96 96 96 96 96
Adjusted R
2 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.27 
 
to local store closures is linked to a decline in firm revenue, with coefficients that are between -0.037 
(statistically significant at the two percent level) and -0.060 (statistically significant at the one percent 
level). 
Table 11: Firm Revenue and Bankrupt Store Closures, Reduced Form OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bankrupt stores
Same address -0.037 ***
(0.015)
Distance ≤ 50 meters -0.058 ***
(0.022)
50 meters < distance ≤ 100 meters -0.045 ***
(0.026)
100 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters -0.060 ***
(0.023)
0 meters < distance ≤ 250 meters -0.051 ***
(0.018)
Bankruptcy -0.053 -0.049 -0.015 0.008 -0.011
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073)
Market-to-Book 0.148 * 0.147 * 0.148 * 0.147 * 0.149 *
(0.089) (0.088) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089)
Profitability 0.039 0.087 0.073 0.099 0.107
(0.386) (0.365) (0.379) (0.371) (0.374)
Leverage -0.118 -0.11 -0.097 -0.098 -0.112
(0.309) (0.305) (0.309) (0.304) (0.304)
Liquidity 0.309 0.259 0.246 0.278 0.305
(0.256) (0.249) (0.251) (0.249) (0.259)
Size 0.063 ** 0.068 ** 0.064 ** 0.071 ** 0.070 **
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 424 424 424 424 424
Number of Firms 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted R
2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.28 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that bankrupt firms impose negative externalities on non-bankrupt firms by 
weakening of the economics of agglomeration in retail centers. Store closures by national retailers, 
which are often anchor tenants in malls and shopping centers, lead to the reduced attractiveness of 
retail areas as customers prefer to shop in areas with full vacancy. This, in turn, leads to declines in 
demand for retail services in the vicinity of bankrupt stores, causing contagion from financially 
distressed firms to non-bankrupt firms.  
Chapter 2: The Human Capital Costs of Financial Distress 28 
 
Introduction 
Do financial frictions affect firm-level employment decisions? This question has been asked with 
renewed interest and urgency following the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The crisis led to a sharp 
contraction  in  non-financial  corporate  lending,  placing  potentially  severe  external  financing 
constraints on firms. At the same time, the labor market in the United States witnessed significant 
increases in unemployment: from a low of 4.4% in May 2007 to a high of 10.0% in October 2009. 
How are these outcomes related? A negative productivity shock in the real economy causes financial 
markets to weaken and employment to decline broadly. This may reflect an important link between 
financial markets and firm-level employment or it may not. In an attempt to understand this channel, 
I use  the  financial  crisis as a shock to the  supply of external  financing and  focus on financial 
frictions leading to unemployment. 
This paper examines how external financing constraints affect both the quantity of labor a firm 
chooses to employ as well as the quality. I introduce new, hand-collected data on the occupations of 
workers affected in mass layoff instances in California between 2006 and 2011, which allows me to 
assess the quality of dismissed workers using proxy measures of human capital. An exploration of 
these  relationships  is  key  aspect  of  an  understanding  of  firm  behavior  as  well  as  variation  in 
employment over the business cycles. 
Theoretically,  the  availability  of  external  financing  should  affect  employment  decisions  for 
several reasons. I first examine the impact on the quantity of labor. External financing constraints 
may affect employment indirectly through an impact on the level of investment (labor and capital 
being complements in the production function). In the face of high external finance premiums, 
employment will shrink alongside reductions in capital expenditures. Alternatively, in the context of 
liquidity constraints, payments to labor may exceed cash flow generation. Firms that finance labor 
activity using working capital will be forced to reduce payroll costs as working capital deteriorates. 29 
 
Finally,  particularly  in  crisis  environments,  firms  may  reduce  employment  as  a  means  to 
preemptively reduce their dependence on external financing from unstable or weak banks. 
Reducing labor may be particularly attractive to firms if capital is fixed or if adjustment costs are 
large. But labor theory tells us that layoffs may not be costless, as they may destroy worker-firm 
match-specific capital. I next examine the impact of external financing constraints on the quality of 
labor (i.e. the degree of human capital) affected in mass layoff instances. Theoretical predictions 
from labor economics hold that, given a layoff decision, firms will sort workers in inverse order of 
firm-specific human capital and begin dismissing workers at the bottom. This is driven by the result 
that workers with more firm-specific skills contribute more to a firm’s profitability. Though a more 
cursory explanation, this behavior is also consistent with a “last in, first out” pecking order. I explore 
how this theoretical pecking order is affected by financing constraints. 
These questions have remained unanswered, as we have lacked data on firm-level employment 
outcomes that includes occupational detail. I introduce new, hand-collected data on mass layoffs in 
California between 2006 and 2011, which includes detail on the occupations affected in each layoff 
instance. This allows me to investigate firms’ propensity for mass layoffs during the financial crisis as 
well as their human capital choices in the face of a mass layoff. 
Testing for a causal effect of financial constraints on firm employment decisions is complicated 
by  identification  concerns.  In  particular,  variables  measuring  firms’  financial  health  are  also 
correlated with their demand for labor. To address this, I use the onset of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis provides an identification tool. The crisis led  to a significant contraction  in  non-financial 
corporate lending, representing potentially severe external financing constraints for firms. Firms that 
faced the need to rollover existing long-term corporate debt obligations at the onset of the crisis 
encountered  sudden  and  unexpected  difficulty.  This  contraction  in  lending  arguably  provides  a 
shock to the supply of external financing that is unrelated to the strength of corporate business 30 
 
fundamentals. To isolate the effect of financial constraints on employment decisions, I exploit firm-
level variation in the amount of debt coming due at the onset of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
following Almeida et al. (2012). I examine whether firms with large fractions of long-term debt 
maturing  at  the  onset  of  the  crisis  adjust  their  employment  behavior  in  ways  that  are  more 
pronounced than otherwise similar firms that did not face a need to refinance their long-term debt at 
that time. To the extent that these refinancing effects are large, they imply that the terms of financial 
contracting (i.e. contract maturity) affect employment outcomes. 
Long-term debt is typically publicly-held and difficult to renegotiate on short notice (Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996)). Because cumulative, hard-to-reverse decisions made several years in the past 
affect current long-term debt maturity structures, it is hard to argue that firms are at their optimal 
debt maturities at all times. Therefore, whether a firm had to refinance a significant portion of its 
long-term debt right after August 2007 is plausibly unrelated to the firm’s operating performance. I 
exploit this maturity-structure discontinuity, using the portion of long-term debt pre-set to mature 
right  after  fall  of  2007  to  gauge  how  firms’  employment  decisions  are  affected  by  financing 
constraints. While my analysis treats variation in the fraction of long-term debt that comes due right 
after  August  2007  as  exogenous  to  firm  outcomes,  it  is  plausible  that  other  sources  of  firm 
heterogeneity could underlie these relationships. To alleviate this concern, I use a difference-in-
difference  matching  estimation  approach  that  incorporates  observable  firm  characteristics  and 
accounts for unobservable, idiosyncratic firm effects. The tests match firms that should be more 
susceptible to the negative effects of refinancing constraints (firms that had a large fraction of their 
long-term debt coming due when the crisis hit) with firms that did not face a need to rollover their 
debt, allowing me to compare otherwise similar firms that differ only in their profiles of long-term 
debt maturity. The tests account for time-invariant heterogeneity by comparing within-firm changes 
in outcome variables from the period that precedes the 2007 credit shock to the period that follows. 31 
 
My findings are as follows. I first verify pronounced cross-firm variation in long-term debt 
maturity  structure  at  the  onset  of  the  2007  crisis.  Cross-sectional  variation  in  long-term  debt 
maturity is persistent over time, with similar dispersion patterns observed in the years preceding the 
crisis. I isolate a sizable pool of firms with a large fraction of long-term debt maturing right after the 
crisis (financially constrained firms) that are virtually identical to other firms whose debt happens to 
mature in later years (financially unconstrained firms). I show that these two groups of firms are 
similar across all characteristics except for the share of long-term debt due at the onset of the crisis. 
I then show that whether a firm faced financing constraints due to impending debt maturity has 
important  consequences  for  post-crisis  employment  outcomes.  While  the  growth  rate  of  total 
employment declined for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, it declined 5.07% 
more among the financially constrained. In order to verify that the employment behavior differences 
between the two groups are particular to an environment in which credit is tight, I replicate my 
experiment over a number of non-crisis years. In non-crisis years, debt coming due is unlikely to 
induce financial constraint; consistent with this, debt maturity leads to layoffs only for firms whose 
debt comes due in the 2007 environment of tight credit.  
Having  shown  that  financial  constraints  cause  firms  to  reduce  employment,  I  then  turn  to 
understand how adjustments are made. In particular, do firms lay off workers or simply slow hiring? 
Using  data  on  layoff  instances,  I  repeat  the  analysis  on  changes  in  total  employment  using  an 
indicator variable of firm-level mass layoffs. I find that the likelihood of a mass layoff increased 
6.77% between 2007 and 2008 among financially constrained firms, though it barely changed at all 
among unconstrained firms. Overall, firms facing external financing constraints were 6.89% more 
likely to make a mass layoff than otherwise similar but unconstrained firms. The effect of financing 
constraints on the likelihood of mass layoff instances is insignificant in subsequent years. 32 
 
Conditional on a mass layoff, do constrained firms also lay off more workers? Do financing 
constraints influence the degree of human capital of workers affected in a layoff event? I restrict my 
attention to the subset of firms that made a mass layoff and examine the quality of layoff instances 
using  proxies  for  human  capital  by  occupation.  I  find  that  external  financing  constraints  have 
important consequences for the degree of human capital laid off. Financially constrained firms laid 
off workers with higher average annual salaries following the onset of the crisis. The difference-in-
difference estimate implies that financially constrained firms laid off workers earning $12,617 more 
relative  to  financially  unconstrained  firms  and  relative  to  the  pre-crisis  period.  I  do  not  find  a 
significant difference in the average annual salary of workers laid off by financially unconstrained 
firms and the difference between salaries of laid off workers across constrained and unconstrained 
firms does not persist in later years. These results are robust to alternative measures of human 
capital (educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training).  
From measures of salary, educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training, it 
appears that financially constrained firms laid off higher human capital workers following the onset 
of the crisis relative to unconstrained firms. The fact that the outcomes tend in the same direction 
adds credibility to the result. Overall, the results point to destruction of the firm-worker match in a 
sort  of  human  capital  fire  sale  brought  on  by  financial  constraint.  This  may  reflect  a  strategic 
decision to lay off relatively more expensive employees in a struggle to conserve cash holdings. 
In  a  follow-up  exercise, I  note  that  many  firms  in  my  dataset  laid  off  workers  in  multiple 
instances. I look into how the average level of human capital of laid off workers varies within firms 
by layoff instance. Financially healthy firms laid off workers in order of human capital, letting go of 
low  human  capital  workers  first  and  high  human  capital  workers  later.  However,  financially 
distressed firms behave in the opposite manner, laying off high human capital workers in early layoff 33 
 
instances and deescalating to low human capital workers later on. This result contradicts theoretical 
predictions concerning firms’ investment in human capital. 
Finally, I consider stock market reactions to mass layoff announcements. A valuation-based 
understanding of layoff announcements should provide additional context in which to interpret the 
results described above. I find 3-day cumulative abnormal returns to be slightly negative following a 
mass  layoff  announcement.  This  is  consistent  with  Farber  and  Hallock  (2008),  who  document 
negative  returns  among  firms  with  layoff  announcements  reported  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal 
between  1970  and  1999.  In  addition,  I  find  a  negative  relationship  between  3-day  cumulative 
abnormal returns and the degree of human capital laid off. These results indicate that valuations 
decline  upon  destruction  of  the  value  created  in  worker-employer  relationships.  Moreover,  the 
decline is particularly pronounced for high human capital worker-employer relationships, suggesting 
that the market understands the cost of these types of layoffs. 
Theoretical Framework 
The link between financial constraint and firm employment decisions is analogous to the link 
between financial constraint and firm expenditures, a well-examined question in corporate finance. I 
begin by describing that literature in order to highlight useful parallels and distinctions for thinking 
about employment. Modigliani and Miller (1958) predict that, in perfect markets, a firm’s financial 
structure will not affect its market value. Thus, real firm decisions, motivated by the maximization of 
shareholders’ claims, are independent of financial factors. Applied to firms’ capital investment, this 
prediction provided a foundation for the neoclassical theory of investment (Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967),  Jorgenson  and  Siebert  (1968)  and  Elliot  (1973)),  in  which  a  firm’s  inter-temporal 
optimization problem could be solved without reference to a firm’s financial condition.  
Stepping away from a Modigliani-Miller world, the cost of external finance may exceed the cost 
of internal finance (due to information asymmetries, agency costs, incomplete contracting or the tax 34 
 
system), in which case the two are not perfect substitutes. A central prediction is that, where the cost 
of external finance exceeds the cost of internal finance (also known as a positive external finance 
premium), firms will respond by decreasing capital expenditures (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988,  2000),  Kaplan  and  Zingales  (1997,  2000),  Lamont  (1997)  and  Rauh  (2006)).  While  this 
literature is interested the impact of financial constraints on real outcomes in general, it has little to 
say about labor outcomes. Yet labor is a very large share of firm expenditure. This paper fits into a 
burgeoning literature that is concerned instead with the impact of financial constraints on firm 
employment. 
Theoretically,  the  cost  and  availability  of  external  debt  financing  should  affect  employment 
decisions for several reasons. Labor and capital being complements in the production function, the 
availability of external finance may affect employment indirectly through its impact on the level of 
investment.  In  the  face  of  high  external  finance  premiums,  employment  will  shrink  naturally 
alongside reductions in capital expenditures. Alternatively, in the context of liquidity constraints, 
payments to labor may exceed cash flow generation. Firms that finance labor activity using working 
capital will be forced to reduce payroll costs as working capital deteriorates (Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1988)).  Finally,  firms  may  also  reduce  employment  in  a  push  to  preemptively  reduce  their 
dependence on debt financing from unstable or weak banks. The link between financial constraints 
and employment is also explored in Benmelech, Bergman and Seru (2011), which uses a set of quasi-
experiments to suggest that financial constraints and the availability of credit play an important role 
in  determining  firm  employment  levels  as  well  as  aggregate  unemployment.  This  paper  uses 
observations  on  layoff  instances  in  addition  to  data  on  total  employment  by  firm,  as  well  as 
information on the human capital of affected workers. 
Concerning  the  human  capital  of  affected  workers,  I  am  interested  in  whether  financial 
constraints also impact employment quality, i.e. the degree of human capital that a firm chooses to 35 
 
employ. Economic theory on firm investment in human capital is rooted in the classic papers of 
Becker (1962) and Oi (1962). They wrote about the distinction between general and firm-specific 
training of workers. By definition, firm-specific knowledge is useful only in the firms providing it, 
whereas general knowledge is translatable to other firms. Accordingly, firms are predicted to pay for 
specific knowledge but leave the costs of general training to be borne by the workers. This helps 
explain why workers with highly firm-specific skills are less likely to quit their jobs. It also suggests 
that they are the last to be laid off during business downturns; we should expect layoffs to affect 
workers with high degrees of firm-specific human capital disproportionately less and workers with 
low degrees of firm-specific human capital disproportionately more. What about general human 
capital? More recent papers have broadened the theories laid down by Becker (1962) and Oi (1962) 
by  weakening  the  certain  assumptions,  such  as  that  of  perfectly  competitive  labor  markets. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999)
5 and Kessler and Lülfesmann (2006) suggest that firms have an 
interest in general human capital in addition to specific and are indeed willing to pay for it. This may 
be due to labor market imperfections, to firms’ desires to gather superior information on workers’ 
abilities,  or complementarities between  specific and general  training. While  the  explanations are 
varied, there is strong evidence that firms are invested in levels of general human capital in addition 
to levels of specific human capital. This leads to a view that layoffs affect workers with high degrees 
of general human capital disproportionately less as well, and workers with low degrees of general 
human capital disproportionately more. 
The layoff data that I rely on reflects mass layoff instances in particular. Employers use mass 
layoffs for a host of strategic reasons: change of location, outsourcing of labor, productivity gains 
that render some functions superfluous or the elimination of an unviable business line. In these 
examples,  mass  layoffs  are  a  planned,  strategic  management  choice  and  may  be  unrelated  to 
                                                           
5 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) note the familiar example of employers sending workers to college, certificate or MBA programs 
offering general skills. 36 
 
financing constraints. Yet they are also commonly related to financial distress. Abowd, McKinney 
and Vilhuber (2005) relate mass layoff events to firm closures, finding that mass layoffs increase the 
probability of a closure. They also find that layoffs occur disproportionately more often in firms that 
employ workers in the lowest quartile of the human capital distribution and disproportionately less 
often in firms that employ workers in the highest quartile of the human capital distribution. This 
makes sense: firms are more willing to lay off employees that can be easily trained. Conditioning 
their  analysis  the  level  of  human  capital  within  each  firm,  they  find  that  firms  that  employ  a 
disproportionate fraction of workers in the highest quartile of the human capital distribution are less 
likely to close even given a layoff event. High human capital appears to protect the firm from 
closure. 
Research on the effects of layoffs on short-run stock prices is extensive. The key paper on the 
topic is Farber and Hallock (2008), which uses an event study methodology to analyze the stock 
price reactions to 5,353 Fortune 500 company layoff announcements collected from the Wall Street 
Journal from 1970-2007. The paper finds three-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
publication of layoff events to be negative (and gradually less negative over time). The authors also 
analyze  the  stock  price  reaction  conditional  on  the  reported  reasons  for  the  layoffs.  They  find 
positive cumulative abnormal returns for reasons such as “reorganization” and “plant closing” but 
negative cumulative abnormal returns for “demand slump” and “cost.” The signs of these reactions 
make good sense. Reorganizations and plant closings are byproducts of strategic change within the 
company. Layoffs attributed to these reasons are more likely to be seen as management’s good 
stewardship, causing stock prices to rise. The opposite is true for layoffs attributed to a demand 
slump or the need for cost cutting: as symptoms of poor stewardship, it is intuitive that these layoff 
events would prompt a fall in stock prices. They find negative returns to be largely associated with 
demand slumps yet, the financial crisis having induced an economy-wide demand slump, layoffs 37 
 
motivated by reduced demand may have been assessed differently between 2007 and 2009. It may 
also have been the case that firms had excess labor leading up to the crisis, in which case mass 
layoffs may have enhanced value. 
My results complement research documenting that layoffs are more prevalent among financially 
constrained firms, whose management faces greater pressure to reorganize (Denis and Kruse (2000), 
Kahl (2002) and Powell and Yawson (2009)). The paper also adds to a large literature documenting 
layoff characteristics (Itkin and Salmon (2011), Guthrie and Datta (2008), Pagano and Volpin (2005), 
and Cappelli (2000)). 
Data 
This paper introduces a new, hand-collected data set on firm-level mass layoffs in California 
from 2006-2011. The dataset is built around firm-level mass layoff instances. Since my analysis also 
requires additional worker and firm characteristics, I combine the following four datasets into one: 
(1) firm-level mass layoff data available as a result of the WARN Act; (2) proxies of human capital 
by occupation (salary, educational attainment, work experience, and on-the-job training) from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); (3) quarterly and annual firm fundamentals as well as credit ratings 
from Compustat; and (4) stock price and market return data from CRSP. The final, combine dataset 
consists of 412 unique, public firms having made 824 mass layoffs in California between 2006 and 
2011. This section describes each source, data selection and variable construction.  
Firm-Level Mass Layoff Data 
Firm-level data on mass layoffs is available as a result of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification (WARN) Act,
6 passed federally in 1989. The WARN Act requires firms with more than 
100 full-time employees to provide 60-day advanced notice of impending mass layoff events, defined 
by the BLS as affecting 50 or more employees of a single company in a given location. Notice must 
                                                           
6 I compiled the data from over 3,000 PDF pages of notices available to the public from the State of California’s Employment 
Development Department: http://www.edd.ca.gov/jobs_and_training/layoff_services_warn.htm. 38 
 
be given in writing to: (1) the employees’ representative or, if there is no representative, to each 
affected employee; (2) the state dislocated worker unit; and (3) the local government where the plant 
is located. 
Implementation of the WARN Act having been left to states, the availability of WARN data 
varies widely. Compliance with the Act, the variables collected, the time span over which they have 
been collected, as well as public access to the records, vary by state. The non-standard nature of the 
reporting makes it difficult to imagine a national dataset. Many states would be missing, there would 
be few data fields in common, and the time series would be short. As a result, I have chosen to 
focus on a single state, California. In addition to being a large economy, California has enforced 
thorough WARN reporting and has made the records relatively easily accessible. It is also the only 
state to require firms to report the occupations affected in a mass layoff, which is important to my 
analysis. Californian WARN notices require the following information: company name; address of 
layoff location; layoff date; date notice received; number of employees affected; layoff or closure; 
severance; union representation; bumping rights; and occupations of affected employees. In addition, 
California defines a mass layoff more narrowly, as affected 35 or more employees. To my knowledge, 
this research is the first to describe and analyze firm-level layoffs beyond a case study of a single firm. 
Figure 1 presents a geographic scatter plot of all mass layoff instances in California between 
2006  and  2011.  Mass  layoff  instances  are  largely  clustered  in  the  urban  areas  surrounding  San 
Francisco and Los Angeles, corresponding to the locations of most large firms, retail stores, and 
production facilities. Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of layoff instances over this period. The raw 
data consists of 4,335 layoff events among 1,274 unique public and private firms, affecting a total of 
260,100 workers. The average layoff event in this period affected 110 workers. Several major layoff 
events stand out. The largest and third largest layoff events belong to Macy’s, which laid off 2,053 
workers on September 1
st, 2006 and 1,501 workers on May 1
st, 2009.  39 
 
Figure 1: Geographic Dispersion of Mass Layoffs in California, 2006-2011 
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Figure 2: Number of Workers Affected by Mass Layoffs in California 
 
The second largest layoff event belongs to United Airlines, which laid off 1,549 workers on October 
5
th, 2008. The fourth largest layoff belongs to Circuit City, which laid off 1,163 workers on March 
21
st, 2009. The fifth largest layoff belongs to Washington Mutual, which laid off 1,153 workers on 
June 30
th, 2008.  
I  compared  the  WARN  series  to  both  initial  unemployment  claims  from  the  BLS  and  an 
estimate of mass layoffs derived from BLS data in order to get a sense for the completeness of the 
WARN data. Initial claims are only a partial description of layoffs in California, as not all those laid 
off apply for unemployment assistance. Nevertheless, initial claims offer a more complete picture of 
layoffs than the WARN data, as an unemployment assistance claim can be initiated by any laid off 
worker,  not  just  those  affected  by  a  mass  layoff.  I  find  that  the  WARN  data  represents 
approximately 20% of initial claims. In another attempt to assess the completeness of the WARN 
data, I estimate the minimum amount of mass layoffs in California using Mass Layoff Statistics 
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(MLS) from the BLS. The MLS program does not report the number of employees affected by mass 
layoffs, but it does report the number of monthly mass layoff incidents in the state. California 
defines  a  mass  layoff  as  a  layoff  incident  affecting  at  least  35  workers.  Thus,  I  assume  that  a 
minimum of 35 workers are affected in each mass layoff incident and simply multiply the number of 
mass layoff events by 35 in order to arrive at a minimum estimate. I find that the WARN data 
represents 60% of estimated mass layoffs. This leads me to believe that some firms are simply not 
reporting mass layoff events as they are required to by state and federal law. This is unsurprising, as 
there is slight or no enforcement of the WARN Act in California. Non-reporting firms are likely to 
be less well-run administratively rather than intentionally flouting the state disclosure requirement; I 
do not believe that the omission of these firms biases the data in a predictable direction. 
Table 12 presents a tabulation of mass layoff events by industry and Table 13 tabulates the 
employers having fired the greatest numbers of workers. Financial firms (including Wells Fargo, 
Washington Mutual, Fleetwood, Indymac, Citigroup) made a large number of mass layoffs, as did 
major retail firms (including Macy’s, Mervyn’s, Circuit City, Target, JC Penney’s). The airline and 
aerospace industry (including United, American, ATA, Boeing), persistently beleaguered, cut many 
jobs as well. The mix of occupations affected in each mass layoff depends to some extent on the 
firm. For example, the WARN data reveals that aerospace engineers and flight attendants were laid 
off by United Airlines, whereas marketing managers and sales personnel were laid off by Macy’s. 
However, each mass layoff notice pertains to a variety of occupations and those occupations tend to 
be repeated among firms within the same industry. 
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Table 12: Layoff Firms by Industry 
 
Table 13: Layoffs by Employers Having Laid Off the Most Workers 
 
 
 
Fama-French 12 Industry Classifications # Firms
Finance 357
Business Equipment 165
Other 145
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 136
Wholesale, Retail 111
Manufacturing 107
Utilities 60
Consumer Non-Durables 58
Telephone and Television 45
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 36
Consumer Durables 29
Chemicals and Allied Products 26
1,274
Macy's 3,554 JC Penney 337
United Airlines 2,095 Owens Corning 328
Circuit City 1,526 Medtronic 323
General Electric 1,319 Conagra Foods 322
Intel 1,292 Marriot 311
Target 1,161 Siemens 311
Washington Mutual 1,153 Cardinal Health 291
Boeing 1,069 TTM Technologies 283
Applebee's 1,049 Cisco Systems 275
American Airlines 971 Zebra Technologies 268
AT&T 949 Adobe Systems 263
Abbott Vascular 867 Smurfit Stone 261
KLA Tencor 770 Electronic Arts 255
Fleetwood 729 Quiksilver 244
Citigroup 678 Xyratex International 243
Intuit 638 Callaway Golf 240
Lockheed Martin 489 Hewlett Packard 237
Oracle 413 Albertson's 231
Technicolor Home Entertainment 402 Northrop Grunman 230
Wells Fargo 376 JP Morgan Chase 230
Company
# of Employees 
Affected
Company
# of Employees 
Affected43 
 
It is common for firms to engage in multiple rounds of mass layoffs as opposed to all at once; 
sometimes the layoff events are separated by years, sometimes merely by several weeks. Thus, firms 
behave as though WARN notice filings carry either no market signal or at least not a negative 
market signal. It may be that press releases lead the WARN announcements, in effect nullifying the 
information that they contain for financial markets. Multiple mass layoffs may be a sign of ongoing 
financial constraint. 
Constructing Proxies for Human Capital By Occupation From the BLS 
In order to construct measured of human capital by occupation, the job titles reported in the 
WARN data had to be unified by occupation. I unified WARN job titles by hand using the standard 
occupation  classification  (SOC)  system  available  from  the  BLS.  Once  WARN  job  titles  were 
matched to SOC occupations they were also linked to SOC codes, which allowed me to connect to 
other occupational data tracked by the BLS. This data is the basis of four human capital proxies: 
annual salary, educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training.  
Annual  salary  is  available  by  occupation  (840  unique  occupation  classifications)  and  by 
metropolitan statistical area (24 unique areas within California). To take an example, this allows me 
to estimate that a typical chemical engineer in the San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos area earns an 
annual  salary of $86,490. In the  absence  of a direct measure  of worker skill,  the  literature  has 
commonly used wages as a proxy. Examples include Bernard and Jensen (2002) and Dunne and 
Roberts (1990), who consider the determinants of wages and the effects of wages on plant closures 
and Carneiro and Portugal (2003), who consider the link between wages and displacement events. 
Next, SOC codes link to estimates of educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job 
training for each occupation. Occupations receive designations in three categories: 
1)  Entry-level  education:  doctoral/professional  degree;  master’s;  bachelor’s;  associate’s; 
postsecondary; some college; high school; less than high school 44 
 
2)  Related work experience: > 5 years; 1-5 years; < 1 year; none 
3)  On-the-job  training:  internship;  apprenticeship;  long-term  (>  1  year);  moderate  (1-12 
months); short-term (< 1 month); none 
To take an example, a typical judge has a doctoral or professional degree, more than 5 years of work 
experience and short-term on-the-job training. Layoffs in California between 2006 and 2011 are 
summarized according to these four human capital proxies in Table 14. 
A worker’s human capital can be thought of in two pieces: firm-specific and general. The proxies 
described above are each indicators of a worker’s general human capital. Ideally, I would have data 
on firm-level investment in specific skills, i.e. those that do not easily translate to other firms or 
context, by occupation. Tenure at a firm would be a rough but reasonable proxy, as firm-specific 
knowledge  naturally  increases  with  tenure.  However,  lacking  data  on  tenure  or  potential  other 
proxies, I use the four general human capital proxies as though they are representative of firm-
specific human capital and interpret the results with this caveat. 
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Table 14: Measures of the Human Capital of Laid Off Workers 
 
 
 
Average Annual Salary # Laid Off % of Layoffs
> $150,000 24,267 9%
$125,000 - $150,000 19,097 7%
$100,000 - $125,000 19,305 7%
$75,000 - $100,000 63,956 25%
$50,000 - $75,000 54,959 21%
$25,000 - $50,000 29,557 11%
< $25,000 48,959 19%
Total 260,100
Educational Attainment # Laid Off % of Total Laid Off
Doctoral/Professional Degree 4,446 2%
Master's Degree 16,065 6%
Bachelor's Degree 50,124 19%
Associate's Degree 24,650 9%
Post-Secondary Vocational Award 13,305 5%
Some College 41,810 16%
High School 52,628 20%
Less than High School 57,072 22%
Total 260,100
Related Work Experience # Laid Off % of Total Laid Off
> 5 Years 66,843 26%
1-5 Years 103,550 40%
< 1 Year 35,067 13%
None 54,640 21%
Total 260,100
On-the-Job Training # Laid Off % of Total Laid Off
> 1 year 61,126 24%
1-12 Months 101,179 39%
< 1 Month 42,193 16%
None 55,601 21%
Total 260,100
This table summarizes the human capital of workers laid off in mass layoff instances in California between 2006
and 2011 using the following four proxies available from the BLS: annual average salary by occupation,
estimated educational attainment by occupation, recommended related work experience and estimated on-the-
job training. A total of 260,100 workers were affected in mass layoffs over this period. The panels of the table
shows the distribution of layoffs by proxy.46 
 
Compustat Annual Fundamental Data 
I consider the entire universe of firms from the Compustat Annual and Quarterly Fundamental 
Files  between  2000  and 2011.  In  addition  to  balance  sheet  and  income  statement  information, 
Compustat also reports the number of workers employed by a firm. The main independent variables 
are size (represented as the log value of total assets), Tobin’s Q (proxied by the market-to-book 
ratio), cash flow, cash balance, and long-term debt normalized by total assets. Variable definitions 
and constructions are detailed in the Appendix. Finally, I use four-digit SIC codes in order to map 
each firm’s industry into Fama-French 12 and Fama-French 48 industry classifications. 
CRSP Stock Price and Market Return Data 
I use value-weighted return and market return data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) to calculate 3-day cumulative abnormal returns for each firm surrounding each layoff 
event. The CRSP data was merged using CUSIP and stock tickers. 
The 2007 Credit Shock and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt 
I  begin  my  overview  of  the  credit  crisis  by  describing  changes  in  3-month  LIBOR  and 
commercial paper rates – both common sources of short-term financing – in August 2007.
7 Spreads 
between LIBOR and commercial paper and comparable-maturity Treasuries were low in the period 
between 2001 and the early part of 2007 (around 0.5%) but spiked in August 2007 (around 1.5%). 
The  re-pricing  of  credit  instruments  spread  from  short -term  bank  financing  to   longer-term 
instruments  quickly,  highlighting  the  interdependence  of  financial  market  segments.  Current 
research on the crisis suggests that spreads on long-term corporate bonds increased sharply. Adrian, 
Colla and Shin (2012) find that spreads relative to comparable-maturity Treasuries tripled during the 
financial crisis, from 156 basis points in the second quarter of 2007 to 436 basis points in the second 
quarter of 2009. This evidence supports the conjecture that there was a substantial increase in the 
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cost of short- and long-term bond financing. This environment of tight corporate credit provides a 
unique opportunity to identify the effects of supply contractions on corporate policies. 
My identification strategy also requires variation in long-term debt maturity across firms. In 
particular, it relies on an adequate group of firms with long-term debt maturing right after the onset 
of the crisis. One might expect firms to have well-diversified maturity structures, protecting against 
the need to repay or refinance significant amounts of debt in any particular year; if true, this would 
limit the effectiveness of the proposed strategy. Fortunately, a literature on capital market frictions 
outlines evidence that it is difficult for firms to maintain their optimal capital structures.
8  
Almeida et al. (2012) investigated the distribution of debt maturities for their Compustat sample 
of firms. For each firm in the third quarter of 2007, they collected information on the amount of 
long-term debt maturing in the subsequent five years and report these amounts as a fraction of total 
long-term debt (between 0% and 100%). They find that while a significant number of firms have 
long-term debt maturing largely in 2008 (some firms with nearly 100% of their long -term debt 
maturing that year), many firms do not have any significant amount of long -term debt maturing in 
2008. Other years exhibit similar variation. Debt maturity commonly concentrates in a particular 
year, but not necessarily in 2008. Further, the distributions of  long-term debt maturing in the 
individual years beyond 2008 (2009 through 2012) look fairly similar to the distribution of long-term 
debt maturing in 2008. This suggests that firms may not always try to renegotiate in advance to 
prolong debt maturities. They also examine the distributions of debt maturities in years prior to 2007 
and find that they look very similar to years following 2008. 
Empirical Design 
This section describes the basic empirical design, including the matching methodology to 
construct a comparison group and difference-in-difference regression specifications. My empirical 
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strategy uses variation in long-term debt maturity at the onset of the 2007 crisis as a tool to identify 
the  effect  of  credit  supply  shocks  on  corporate  policies.  In  a  frictionless  capital  markets,  debt 
maturity is irrelevant. Firms can always refinance and re-contract their way around the potential 
effects of a balloon debt payment. The 2007 crisis is a unique context because financial markets 
contain more friction in a crisis environment. Maturing debt was not as easy to rollover and, at the 
same time, firms found it difficult to substitute across alternative funding sources. As a result, firms 
that had large portions of debt maturing at the onset of the 2007 crisis may be expected to face 
tighter financing constraints than firms that did not have a large portion of debt coming due. 
Matching Methodology 
I want to test whether the employment decisions of firms needing to rollover their long-term 
debt obligations at the onset of the credit crisis differed from those of firms that did not face such a 
need.  My  identification  strategy  resembles  an  experiment:  the  firm’s  long-term  debt  maturity 
structure and developments in the financial markets coincide such that the firm needs to refinance a 
large fraction of its debt in the midst of a credit contraction. If debt maturity was randomly assigned 
across firms, then it would suffice to compare the outcomes of firms that had significant debt 
maturing around the time of the crisis with firms whose debt happened to mature at a later date. 
However, the data in this study is non-experimental. The challenge is to gauge firms’ outcomes had 
they not been caught between a credit crisis and the need to refinance their debt. One way to tackle 
this issue is to estimate differences between plausibly counterfactual outcomes and those that are 
observed in the data. Under this approach, a standard method is to use a parametric regression 
where  the  group  of  interest  is  identified  by  a  dummy  variable.  Outcome  differences  are  then 
estimated by the coefficient on the group dummy. 
This strategy is closely related to the design-based test described by Angrist and Pischke (2010). 
Within the natural experiment framework, I add the use of matching estimators, which aim to isolate 49 
 
“treated” observations (firms with debt maturing during the crisis). Next, from the population of 
“non-treated”  observations,  I  look  for  control  observations  that  best  match  the  treated  ones 
according to a set of firm characteristics. In this framework, the set of counterfactuals are restricted 
to the matched controls. In other words, it is assumed that in the absence of the treatment, the 
treated group would have behaved similarly to the control group. The matches are made so as to 
ensure that treated and control observations have identical distributions along each and every one of 
the  firm  characteristic  covariates  chosen  (firm  size,  profitability,  leverage  and  credit  rating). 
Inferences about the treatment of interest (refinancing constraints) are based on differences in the 
post-treatment outcomes of treated and control groups. I rely on the Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
estimator,  as  implemented  by  Abadie,  Drukker,  Herr,  and  Imbens  (2004).  The  Abadie-Imbens 
matching estimator minimizes the  distance  (i.e.,  the  Mahalanobis distance)  between  a vector of 
observed covariates across treated and non-treated firms, finding controls based on matches for 
which the distance between vectors is smallest. I select one matched control for each treated firm. 
The estimator produces heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. 
Matching aims to account for variables that may influence the selection into treatment  and 
observed outcomes. The outcome variables here relate to employment. It is important to include 
only covariates for which one could make a reasonable case for simultaneity in the treatment—
outcome relation. Categorical variables include firms’ industrial classification codes (Fama-French 
SIC-12  and  SIC-48  classification  codes)  and  the  credit  rating  of  public  bonds.  Non-categorical 
variables include size (the log of total assets), Q, cash flow, cash balance and the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets. It is commonly accepted that these covariates capture much of the otherwise 
unobserved  firm  heterogeneity.  The  estimations  implicitly  account  for  all  possible  interactions 
between the included covariates. I estimate Abadie-Imbens’ average effect of the treatment on the 50 
 
treated (ATT) and then model the outcomes in differenced form using difference-in-differences 
estimations. 
Difference-in-Difference Specifications 
I compare changes in employment behavior between financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms (denoted             and              ) and before and after the onset of the financial crisis 
(denoted     and     ). The logic is that employment decisions may be different preceding and 
following  the  crisis,  in  which  case  the  inferences  may  be  biased  by  uncontrolled  firm-specific 
differences. I estimate the following difference-in-difference specification for each outcome variable: 
                                                                    
The coefficient of interest is   , the coefficient on the interaction term                   . In this 
equation,    is the baseline average,    represents the time trend in the financially constrained group, 
   represents the difference between financially constrained and unconstrained groups in the period 
before the crisis and    represents the difference in the changes over time. Assuming that both 
groups face the same credit conditions over time, this specification controls for a possible time trend, 
allowing me to isolate the impact of financial constraints on employment outcomes. 
Some of the outcome variables that I consider, such as the mass layoff indicator as well as 
educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training indicators, are binary. I estimate 
these outcome variables using a linear probability model rather than logit or probit regressions due 
to the difficulty comparing outcomes among groups in these models (see Norton and Ai (2003) and 
Norton, Wang, Ai (2004)). Angrist and Pischke (2009) show linear probability models to be good 
options for certain dependent variables. Given an interest in the average effect of some variable 
upon some outcome, Hellevik (2009) also makes a compelling case for choosing a linear probability 
model of over logit. 
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Results 
This section first presents a comparison of financially constrained and unconstrained firms using 
summary statistics of main variables. I then present evidence on the employment effects of the 2007 
credit crisis and evidence on the human capital effects of the 2007 credit crisis. Last, I present results 
on the stock market reaction following a mass layoff announcement. 
Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 15 for financially constrained and 
financially unconstrained firms (both full and matched samples) at the end of 2007. Recall that 
financially  constrained  firms  are  defined  as  those  for  which  the  percentage  of  long-term  debt 
maturing within one year is greater than 20 percent, while unconstrained firms are those for which 
this percentage is less than or equal to 20 percent. The overall sample consists of 844 firms. The 
treated sample consists of 119, the non-treated of 725, and the control sample of 119 firms using 
one-to-one matching. Looking at differences between financially constrained firms and financially 
unconstrained firms in the full sample, I observe that financially constrained firms are smaller in size, 
have lower long-term leverage, high interest coverage ratios, higher KZ Index values, slightly higher 
Q values, as well as higher cash flow and higher cash balances.  
These sample differences are not unexpected. The goal of matching techniques is to control for 
these distributional differences, as they may affect whether a firm becomes financially constrained as 
well as post-crisis outcomes. The set of unconstrained firms in the matched sample is a subset of 
unconstrained  firms  in  the  full  sample,  where  matching  is  based  on  the  following  set  of  firm 
characteristics: size (log of total assets), market-to-book, cash flow, cash balance, long-term debt 
normalized by assets and Fama-French 12 industry indicators. This approach allows me to compare 
otherwise similar firms, with the only difference being the profile of their long-term debt maturity. 
Upon matching, I have 119 firms in the financially constrained group and 119 firms in the matched, 52 
 
financially  unconstrained  group.  Importantly,  I  find  no  statistical  differences  between  the  main 
variables across the two groups after matching. 
Table 15: A Comparison of Financially Constrained and Unconstrained Firm Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Unconstrained Difference Unconstrained Difference
Total Assets ($mm) $2,694 $10,438 -$7,744 *** $2,577 $117
Total Revenue ($mm) $251 $1,156 -$905 *** $272 -$21
Total Employees 1,363 4,805 -3,442 *** 1,442 -79
Long-Term Leverage $774 $3,712 -$2,938 *** $548 $226
Profitability 0.029 0.026 0.003 0.024 0.005
Interest Coverage 21.257 5.000 4.421 *** 4.842 16.415
Kaplan-Zingales Index 1.277 0.877 0.400 ** 1.540 -0.264
     Market-to-Book 2.694 2.499 0.195 ** 2.587 0.107
     Cash Flow 0.128 0.088 0.039 *** 0.120 0.008
     Cash Balance 0.150 0.103 0.047 * 0.132 0.019
     Dividends 0.008 0.011 -0.003 0.013 -0.004
     Debt Portion 0.370 0.484 -0.114 *** 0.320 0.050
% Changes
     Investment -16.55% 5.59% -22.14% 21.51% -38.06%
     Employment 7.36% 5.36% 2.00% 2.73% 4.64%
     Capital Expenditure 27.76% 14.27% 13.485% *** 19.77% 7.98%
Number of Firms 119 725 119
This table compares financially constrained and unconstrained groups (in the full sample and in the matched
sample) across several dimensions at the end of 2007. Financially constrained firms are defined as those for which
the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (DD1/DLTT) is greater than 20 percent; unconstrained
firms are those for which this percentage is less than or equal to 20 percent. The set of unconstrained firms in the
matched sample is a subset of unconstrained firms in the full sample. To construct it, I match unconstrained firms
to constrained firms using the following set of firm characteristics: size (log of total assets), market-to-book, cash
flow, cash balance, long-term debt normalized by assets and Fama-French 12 industry indicators. The overall
sample consists of 844 firms. The treated sample consists of 119, the non-treated of 725, and the control sample of
119 firms using one-to-one matching. See Appendix for variable definitions.
Financially 
Constrained
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Employment Effects of the 2007 Credit Crisis 
I  examine  the  employment  behavior  of  financially  constrained  and  matched,  financially 
unconstrained firms around the 2007 credit crisis. I first consider changes in total firm employment, 
seeking to understand whether reductions in employment during the crisis were more pronounced 
for financially constrained firms. In Table 16, the first row of Panel A shows that both financially 
constrained  and  unconstrained  firms  were  growing  total  employment  (7.03%  for  financially 
constrained firms versus 6.45% for financially unconstrained firms) between 2006 and 2007. The 
difference is economically and statistically insignificant after matching. Examining the differences in 
total employment changes between 2007 and 2008, I find that employment decisions of financially 
constrained firms differed from those of unconstrained firms. While average annual employment 
among financially constrained firms fell by 1.23%, average annual employment among financially 
unconstrained  firms  continued  to  grow  by  3.08%.  My  estimates  imply  that  annual  changes  in 
employment among  financially  constrained  firms  were  reduced  by  -4.90%  relative  to  financially 
unconstrained firms following the onset of the crisis. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the difference-
in-difference coefficient is -5.07%.  
Panel B presents the difference-in-difference coefficient estimates and Abadie-Imbens estimates 
across  non-crisis  years  (total  employment  changes  from  2000-2001  through  2005-2006).  My 
identification strategy argues that financial constraint is brought on by the perfect storm of debt 
coming due in a credit crisis. In non-crisis years, debt coming due is less likely to induce financial 
constraint. Consistent with this, I find that the effects of financing constraints due to impending 
debt maturity hold only for the 2007 environment of tight credit. Difference-in-difference estimates 
in non-crisis years are economically and statistically insignificant. 
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Table 16: Difference-in-Difference Comparisons of Total Employment Before and After the Onset 
of the 2007 Credit Crisis 
 
Panel A: Percentage Changes in Total Annual Employment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis
Constrained Unconstrained Difference (Constrained - Unconstrained)
2007-2006 7.03% *** 6.45% *** 0.49%
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
2008-2007 -1.23% *** 3.08% *** -4.31% ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Difference (2008/07 - 2007/06) -8.27% *** -3.37% -4.90% ***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Matching Estimator (ATT) -5.07% ***
(0.03)
Panel B: Placebo Tests
2002/01 - 2001/00 0.33%
(0.03)
2003/02 - 2002/01 0.30%
(0.02)
2004/03 - 2003/02 0.30%
(0.04)
2005/04 - 2004/03 0.60%
(0.03)
2006/05 - 2005/04 0.39%
(0.03)
2007/06 - 2006/05 0.48%
(0.04)
2008/07 - 2007/06 -4.07% ***
(0.04)
This table reports evidence on how total firm employment was affected by the fall 2007 credit crisis. Firms with
a large portion of long-term debt maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 (financially constrained firms)
reduced annual employment by 5.07% more than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature
after 2008 (unconstrained firms). Panel A compares changes in total employment between 2006 and 2007 to
changes in total employment between 2007 and 2008. The financially constrained set is defined as firms with at
least 20% of long-term debt maturing in 2008 (with the onset of the financial crisis), while the unconstrained set
is defined as those with less than or equal to 20% of long-term debt maturing in that period. There are 119
financially constrained firms and 119 unconstrained firms. The set of unconstrained firms is constructed by
matching on Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, SIC 12 industry
classifications and credit rating category. Panel B compares annual changes in total employment between non-
crisis years. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Matching Estimator (ATT)
0.21%
(0.02)
0.28%
(0.03)
Difference in Employment Changes 
Between Financially Constrained and 
(0.02)
0.61%
(0.04)
0.28%
(0.03)
-3.80% ***
(0.04)
0.45%
(0.04)
0.38%55 
 
Having  shown  that  financial  constraints  cause  firms  to  reduce  employment,  I  next  turn  to 
understand how adjustments are made. This analysis draws on data on mass layoff instances in 
California between 2006 and 2011, represented by an indicator variable equal to one in the event of 
a mass layoff and zero otherwise. I estimate a difference-in-difference regression of a mass layoff 
indicator variable using a linear probability model, which yields coefficients that describe a firm’s 
mass  layoff  propensity.  Panel  A  of  Table  17  presents  the  main  results.  The  set  of  financially 
constrained  firms  and  the  matched  set  of  unconstrained  firms  both  exhibited  a  mass  layoff 
propensity  of  1.69%  preceding  the  crisis.  The  likelihood  of  a  mass  layoff  among  financially 
constrained  firms  increased  dramatically  between 2007  and  2008,  reaching  8.46%  following  the 
onset  of  the  crisis  but  barely  changing  for  unconstrained  firms.  Looking  at  the  difference-in-
difference estimate, I find that firms facing external financing constraints were 6.50% more likely to 
make a mass layoff compared to otherwise similar but unconstrained firms. The Abadie-Imbens 
estimate of the difference-in-difference mass layoff likelihood is 6.89%. 
Panel B of Table 17 contains difference-in-difference coefficient estimates and Abadie-Imbens 
estimates for subsequent years (from 2008-2009 through 2010-2011). I consider subsequent years 
rather than preceding non-crisis years for these placebo tests because my layoff indicator variable is 
available beginning in 2006. I find the effect of financing constraints on the likelihood of mass layoff 
instances to be insignificant in subsequent years, holding only for the 2007 period. It is somewhat 
surprising that the difference between mass layoff propensities does not last between 2008 and 2009. 
One might have expected mass layoffs to be prevalent among financially constrained firms in across 
these years as well, perhaps tapering off between 2009 and 2010. This indicates that the propensity 
for mass layoffs was concentrated early on in the crisis. Evidence that firms prefer to cluster the 
timing of layoff instances with firms in their industries seems to support this result (see Agarwal and 
Kolev (2012)). 56 
 
Table 17: Difference-in-Difference Comparisons of Mass Layoff Propensity Before and After the 
Onset of the 2007 Credit Crisis 
 
 
 
Panel A: Propensity for Mass Layoffs Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis
Constrained Unconstrained Difference (Constrained - Unconstrained)
2007 1.69% *** 1.69% *** 0.00%
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
2008 8.46% *** 1.97% *** 6.49% ***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Difference (2008 - 2007) 6.77% *** 0.27% 6.50% ***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
Matching Estimator (ATT) 6.89% ***
(0.007)
Panel B: Placebo Tests
2008 - 2007 6.89% ***
(0.007)
2009 - 2008 0.36%
(0.002)
2010 - 2009 0.31%
(0.004)
2011 - 2010 0.13%
(0.004)
0.27%
(0.003)
This table reports evidence on the likelihood of a mass layoff among financially constrained and unconstrained
firms in the fall 2007 credit crisis. Firms with a large portion of long-term debt maturing right after the third
quarter of 2007 (financially constrained firms) were 6.9% more likely to make a mass layoff than otherwise
similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008 (financially unconstrained firms). There is no
significant difference in the mass layoff propensities of financially constrained and unconstrained firms in the
years following 2008. The table presents the likelihood of a mass layoff in percentage points. Panel A compares
the likelihood between 2006 and 2007 to the likelihood between 2007 and 2008. The financially constrained set is
defined as firms with at least 20% of long-term debt maturing in 2008 (with the onset of the financial crisis),
while the unconstrained set is defined as those with less than or equal to 20% of long-term debt maturiting.
There are 119 financially constrained firms and 119 financially unconstrained firms. The set of unconstrained
firms is constructed by propensity score matching on the following firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash
holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, SIC 12 industry classifications and credit rating category. As a
placebo test, Panel B compares the mass layoff propensities across years following 2008. The only significant
difference in mass layoff propensities among financially constrained and unconstrained firms occured between
2007 and 2008. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
6.50% ***
(0.006)
Difference in the Propensity for Mass 
Layoffs Between Financially 
Matching Estimator (ATT)
0.34%
(0.002)
0.11%
(0.004)57 
 
Human Capital Effects of the 2007 Credit Crisis 
Following evidence that external financing constraints affect the level of total employment, do 
financing constraints influence the degree of human capital of workers affected in a layoff event? 
This analysis draws on the subset of firms that made a mass layoff between 2006 and 2011, i.e. the 
intensive margin. I compare the degree of human capital of workers laid off among financially 
constrained firms to the degree of human capital of workers laid off among unconstrained firms, 
using  annual  average  salary,  educational  attainment,  work  experience  and  on-the-job  training  as 
proxies.   
Results for average annual salary are presented in Table 18. I find that financially constrained 
firms laid off workers with higher average annual salaries following the onset of the crisis. The first 
row of Panel A indicates that financially constrained firms laid off workers with an average annual 
salary of $66,151 preceding the crisis, while unconstrained firms laid off workers with an average 
annual salary of $63,357. Following the onset of the crisis, the average annual salary of workers 
affected in a mass layoff rose $13,175 to $77,326 (or nearly 20%). In contrast, the average annual 
salary of workers affected in a mass layoff by unconstrained firms rose less than 2%, from $63,357 
to $64,488. The difference-in-difference estimate implies that financially constrained firms laid off 
workers earning $12,044 more relative to financially unconstrained firms and relative to the pre-crisis 
period. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the difference-in-difference coefficient is $12,617. Panel B 
indicates  that  the  difference  between  salaries  of  laid  off  workers  across  constrained  and 
unconstrained firms does not persist in later years but is specific to the 2007-2008 period. Following 
the result that the propensity for mass layoffs was much reduced in subsequent periods, this result is 
unsurprising. 
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Table 18: Difference-in-Difference Comparisons of the Annual Salaries of Workers Affected by 
Mass Layoffs 
 
Panel A: Propensity for Mass Layoffs Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis
Constrained Unconstrained Difference (Constrained - Unconstrained)
2007 $64,151 *** $63,357 *** $794
($3,705) ($3,354) ($487)
2008 $77,326 *** $64,488 *** $12,838 ***
($3,893) ($3,875) ($572)
Difference (2008 - 2007) $13,175 *** $1,131 $12,044 ***
($878) ($675) ($633)
Matching Estimator (ATT) $12,617 ***
($714)
Panel B: Placebo Tests
2008 - 2007 $12,617 ***
($714)
2009 - 2008 $1,102
($714)
2010 - 2009 $967
($722)
2011 - 2010 $773
($660) ($624)
This table reports evidence on the salaries of workers affected by mass layoff events in the fall 2007 credit crisis.
Firms with a large portion of long-term debt maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 (financially
constrained firms) laid off workers with higher average annual salaries of $12,617 compared to otherwise similar
firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008 (financially unconstrained firms). There is no significant
difference in the salaries of laid off workers between financially constrained and unconstrained firms across non-
crisis years. The table presents the average annual salaries of laid off workers in dollars. Panel A compares the
salaries in 2007 to the salaries in 2008. The financially constrained set is defined as firms with at least 20% of long-
term debt maturing in 2008 (with the onset of the financial crisis), while the unconstrained set is defined as those
with less than or equal to 20% of long-term debt maturiting in that period. There are 68 financially constrained
firms and 68 financially unconstrained firms. The set of unconstrained firms is constructed by matching on the
following set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, SIC
12 industry classifications and credit rating category. As a placebo test, Panel B compares annual average salaries
of laid off workers for the years that follow. The only significant salary difference of laid off workers between
financially constrained firms above financially unconstrained firms occured between 2007 and 2008.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Difference in Salaries of Laid Off 
Workers Between Financially 
Constrained and Unconstrained 
Firms
Matching Estimator (ATT)
$12,044 ***
($633)
$1,094
($669)
$955
($713)
$72859 
 
Similar results also hold for the other three proxies of human capital: educational attainment, 
work experience and on-the-job training. The results for educational attainment by occupation are 
presented  in  Table  19.  I  consider  employment  decisions  affecting  workers  with  high  levels  of 
educational attainment (having a bachelor’s degree or greater). Looking at the first row of Panel A, I 
find that financially constrained firms laid off 10.15% of their share of highly educated workers in 
the pre-crisis period, compared to 9.82% for unconstrained firms. Following the onset of the crisis, 
this portion increases to 38.27% for financially constrained firms, or 28.12%. The increase in the 
portion  of  highly  educated  workers  fired  is  economically  and  statistically  insignificant  among 
unconstrained firms. The difference-in-difference estimate implies that financially constrained firms 
laid off 27.90% more highly educated workers relative to financially unconstrained firms and relative 
to the pre-crisis period. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the difference-in-difference coefficient is 
28.25%. Panel B reports that this difference is significant for the comparison between 2007 and 
2008, but not in subsequent years. These agree with the results on the average salary discussed above, 
as we expect salary and educational attainment to be highly correlated. 
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Table 19: Difference-in-Difference Comparisons of the Education Levels of Workers Affected by 
Mass Layoffs 
 
Panel A: Fraction of Employees with Higher Education Affected in Mass Layoffs
Constrained Unconstrained Difference (Constrained - Unconstrained)
2007 10.15% *** 9.82% *** 0.33%
(0.034) (0.032) (0.003)
2008 38.27% *** 10.04% *** 28.23% ***
(0.032) (0.020) (0.027)
Difference (2008 - 2007) 28.12% *** 0.22% 27.90% ***
(0.025) (0.002) (0.076)
Matching Estimator (ATT) 28.25% ***
(0.060)
Panel B: Placebo Tests
2008 - 2007 28.25% ***
(0.060)
2009 - 2008 4.05%
(0.072)
2010 - 2009 3.58%
(0.065)
2011 - 2010 4.77%
(0.075) (0.066)
This table reports evidence on the education levels of workers affected by mass layoff events in the fall 2007
credit crisis. Firms with a large portion of long-term debt maturing right after the third quarter of 2007
(financially constrained firms) laid off a greater portion of highly educated workers compared to otherwise
similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008 (financially unconstrained firms). The table
summarizes indicator variables representing the fraction of mass layoffs that affected workers with higher
education. Panel A compares the fraction of highly educated workers affected by mass layoffs in 2007 to that in
2008. The financially constrained set is defined as firms with at least 20% of long-term debt maturing in 2008
(with the onset of the financial crisis), while the unconstrained set is defined as those with less than or equal to
20% of long-term debt maturiting in that period. There are 68 financially constrained firms and 68 financially
unconstrained firms. The set of unconstrained firms is constructed by matching on Q, cash flow, size, cash
holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, SIC 12 industry classifications and credit rating category. As a
placebo test, Panel B compares the fraction of highly educated workers affected by mass layoffs for the years
that follow. The only significant difference between financially constrained firms above financially unconstrained
firms occured between 2007 and 2008. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Difference in the Fraction of Higher 
Education Mass Layoffs Between 
Financially Constrained and 
Unconstrained Firms
Matching Estimator (ATT)
27.90% ***
(0.076)
3.99%
(0.069)
3.46%
(0.062)
5.62%61 
 
The results for work experience by occupation are presented in Table 20. As with educational 
attainment, I consider employment decisions affecting workers with high levels of work experience 
(at least five years). Looking at the first row of Panel A, I find that financially constrained firms laid 
off  7.25%  of  their  share  of  workers  with  substantial  work  experience  in  the  pre-crisis  period, 
compared to 7.03% for unconstrained firms. Following the onset of the crisis, this portion increases 
to 35.61% for financially constrained firms, or 28.36%. The increase in the portion of workers with 
substantial work experience is economically and statistically insignificant among unconstrained firms. 
The difference-in-difference estimate implies that financially constrained firms laid off 26.67% more 
highly experienced workers relative to financially unconstrained firms and relative to the pre-crisis 
period. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the difference-in-difference coefficient is 26.14%. We see 
from Panel B that this difference is significant for the comparison between 2007 and 2008 but is 
insignificant in subsequent years. 
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Table 20: Difference-in-Difference Comparisons of Work Experience of Workers Affected by Mass 
Layoffs 
 
Panel A: Fraction of High Work Experience Employees Affected in Mass Layoffs
Constrained Unconstrained Difference (Constrained - Unconstrained)
2007 7.25% *** 7.03% *** 0.22%
(0.024) (0.023) (0.002)
2008 35.61% *** 8.72% *** 26.89% ***
(0.030) (0.017) (0.026)
Difference (2008 - 2007) 28.36% *** 1.69% 26.67% ***
(0.025) (0.015) (0.073)
Matching Estimator (ATT) 26.14% ***
(0.049)
Panel B: Placebo Tests
2008 - 2007 26.14% ***
(0.049)
2009 - 2008 4.94%
(0.065)
2010 - 2009 4.88%
(0.055)
2011 - 2010 4.89%
(0.052) (0.052)
This table reports evidence on the work experience of workers affected by mass layoff events in the fall 2007
credit crisis. Firms with a large portion of long-term debt maturing right after the third quarter of 2007
(financially constrained firms) laid off workers with greater work experience compared to otherwise similar
firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008 (financially unconstrained firms). The table summarizes
indicator variables representing the fraction of mass layoffs that affected workers with at least five years of work
experience. Panel A compares the fraction of workers with high work experience affected by mass layoffs in
2007 to that in 2008. The financially constrained set is defined as firms with at least 20% of long-term debt
maturing in 2008 (with the onset of the financial crisis), while the unconstrained set is defined as those with less
than or equal to 20% of long-term debt maturiting in that period. There are 68 financially constrained firms and
68 financially unconstrained firms. The set of unconstrained firms is constructed by matching on Q, cash flow,
size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, SIC 12 industry classifications and credit rating category. 
As a placebo test, Panel B compares the fraction of high work experience mass layoffs for the years that follow.
The only significant difference between financially constrained firms above financially unconstrained firms
occured between 2007 and 2008. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Difference in the Fraction of High 
Work Experience Mass Layoffs 
Between Financially Constrained and 
Unconstrained Firms
Matching Estimator (ATT)
26.67% ***
(0.073)
5.21%
(0.068)
5.09%
(0.065)
5.13%63 
 
Finally, I consider the differences in layoff decisions concerning workers’ levels of on-the-job 
training. The results are presented in Table 21. I consider employment decisions affecting workers 
with high levels of on-the-training (at least one year). I find that, in comparison to unconstrained 
firms, financially constrained firms laid off a greater fraction of workers with high levels of on-the-
job training. Looking at the first row of Panel A, I find that financially constrained firms laid off 
22.45% of their share of highly trained workers in the pre-crisis period, compared to 20.74% for 
unconstrained  firms.  Following  the  onset  of  the  crisis,  this  portion  increased  to  45.80%  for 
financially constrained firms, or 23.35%. The increase in the portion of highly trained workers fired 
is  economically  and  statistically  insignificant  among  unconstrained  firms.  The  difference-in-
difference estimate implies that financially constrained firms laid off 19.54% more highly trained 
workers relative to financially unconstrained firms and relative to the pre-crisis period. The Abadie-
Imbens estimate of the difference-in-difference coefficient is 21.17%. 
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Table 21: Difference-in-Difference Comparisons of On-the-Job Training of Workers Affected by 
Mass Layoffs 
 
 
Panel A: Fraction of High On-the-Job Training Employees Affected in Mass Layoffs
Constrained Unconstrained Difference (Constrained - Unconstrained)
2007 22.45% *** 20.74% *** 1.71%
(0.076) (0.068) (0.017)
2008 45.80% *** 24.55% *** 21.25% ***
(0.038) (0.049) (0.020)
Difference (2008 - 2007) 23.35% *** 3.81% 19.54% ***
(0.021) (0.033) (0.054)
Matching Estimator (ATT) 21.17% ***
(0.054)
Panel B: Placebo Tests
2008 - 2007 21.17% ***
(0.054)
2009 - 2008 3.87%
(0.063)
2010 - 2009 4.39%
(0.066)
2011 - 2010 4.40%
(0.077) (0.075)
This table reports evidence on the levels of on-the-job training of workers affected by mass layoff events in the
fall 2007 credit crisis. Firms with a large portion of long-term debt maturing right after the third quarter of 2007
(financially constrained firms) laid off workers with greater levels of on-the-job training compared to otherwise
similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008 (unconstrained firms). The table summarizes
indicator variables representing the fraction of mass layoffs that affected workers with at least one year of on-the-
job training. Panel A compares the fraction of workers with high on-the-job training affected by mass layoffs in
2007 to that in 2008. The financially constrained set is defined as firms with at least 20% of long-term debt
maturing in 2008 (with the onset of the financial crisis), while the unconstrained set is defined as those with less
than or equal to 20% of long-term debt maturiting in that period. There are 68 financially constrained firms and
68 financially unconstrained firms. The set of unconstrained firms is constructed by matching on Q, cash flow,
size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, SIC 12 industry classifications and credit rating category. 
As a placebo test, Panel B compares the fraction of high on-the-job training mass layoffs for the years that
follow. The only significant difference between financially constrained firms above financially unconstrained firms 
occured between 2007 and 2008. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Difference in the Fraction of High 
On-the-Job Mass Layoffs Between 
Financially Constrained and 
Unconstrained Firms
Matching Estimator (ATT)
19.54% ***
(0.054)
3.36%
(0.058)
4.13%
(0.067)
4.22%65 
 
From measures of salary, educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training, it 
appears that financially constrained firms laid off higher human capital workers following the onset 
of  the  crisis  relative  to  unconstrained  firms.  Though  these  measures  are  approximate,  it  is 
encouraging that the outcomes tend in the same direction. What can we infer from the differing 
magnitudes?  The  greatest  gap  between  the  human  capital  of  workers  laid  off  by  financially 
constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms shows up for educational attainment (28.25%), 
followed by work experience (26.14%) and then followed by on-the-job training (21.17%). On-the 
job training seems to be the best proxy for firm-specific human capital as opposed to general human 
capital, as it reflects training specific to a firm. However, because this variable is an estimate by 
occupation and not actual on-the-job training reported by firms in WARN filings, there is no way of 
knowing whether the amount of on-the-job training was acquired at the firm that made the mass 
layoff. Thus, it makes little sense to read to closely into the magnitudes of each estimate. 
Next, I am interested in the evolution of human capital affected across multiple mass layoff 
instances. I split the subset of firms that have made a mass layoff into two sub-samples: firms with 
KZ Index values in bottom quartile (which I designate as financially healthy) and firms with KZ 
Index  values  in  the  top  quartile  (which  I  designate  as  financially  distressed).  I  then  estimate  a 
regression relating the number of layoff instances within a firm to the degree of human capital laid 
off. I find the degree of human capital laid off to be positively related to the number of layoff 
instances among financially health firms, but negatively related to the number of layoff instances 
among financially distressed firms. 
Stock Market Reactions to Mass Layoffs Announcements 
Finally,  I  consider  stock  market  reactions  to  mass  layoff  announcements  in  Table  23.  A 
valuation-based understanding of layoff announcements should provide additional context in which 
to interpret the results described above. I find 3-day cumulative abnormal returns to be slightly 66 
 
negative following a mass layoff announcement. This is consistent with Farber and Hallock (2008), 
who document negative returns among firms with layoff announcements reported in the Wall Street 
Journal between 1970 and 1999. In addition, I find a negative relationship between 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns and the degree of human capital laid off. These results indicate that valuations 
decline upon destruction of the value created in worker-employer relationships, and that the decline 
is particularly pronounced for high human capital worker-employer relationships. 
Table 22: The Number of Layoff Instances and the Degree of Human Capital Laid Off 
 
 
 
Average Annual Salary of Workers 
Laid Off By Financially Healthy Firms
Average Annual Salary of Workers 
Laid Off By Distressed Firms
Total Employment -0.104 0.167
(0.100) (0.191)
Q -0.158 ** -0.097 **
(0.061) (0.048)
# of Layoff Instances 0.660 *** -0.823 ***
(0.233) (0.243)
Constant 0.474 *** -0.542 ***
(0.104) (0.163)
R-Squared 0.17 0.21
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.16
Fixed Effects
    Fama-French SIC-12 Industry Yes Yes
    Year Yes Yes
Number of Observations 206 206
This tables presents evidence on the relationship between the number of layoff instances within firms and
the degree of human capital laid off. I split the set of firms having made at least one mass layoff into two
groups: firms with KZ Index values in the bottom quartile (financially healthy) and firms with KZ Index
values in the top quartile (financially distressed firms). The number of layoff instances varies from one to
eight in the period between 2006 and 2011. The average annual salary is the weighted average salary of
workers laid off in a given layoff instance. I find the degree of human capital laid off to be positively
related to the number of layoff instances among financially health firms, but negatively related to the
number of layoff instances among financially distressed firms. I include industry and firm fixed effects.67 
 
Table 23: Stock Market Reactions Following Mass Layoff Announcements 
 
One concern is how market participants observe the degree of human capital affected. WARN 
notifications containing the job titles of affected workers are made public with a lag. It is more likely 
that market participants are simply responding to their knowledge of whether a given firm is a low 
or high capital employer, for example, a manufacturer or a biotech firm. 
Conclusion 
I use the August 2007 credit panic to assess the effect of financial contracting on employment 
outcomes.  In  particular,  I  consider  whether  firms  with  a  significant  portion  of  long-term  debt 
maturing at the onset of the crisis experienced more pronounced outcomes than otherwise similar 
firms that did not face a need to rollover a significant portion of debt during the crisis.  I use 
plausibly  exogenous  variation  to  control  for  observed  and  time-invariant  unobserved  firm 
heterogeneity using a difference-in-difference matching estimator. 
3-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Return
3-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Return
Log of Average Annual Salary -5.38% *** -5.23% ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Higher Education Dummy -1.24% ** -1.11% **
(0.007) (0.005)
Work Experience Dummy -1.94% ** -1.75% ***
(0.004) (0.003)
On-the-Job Training Dummy -1.74% *** -1.75% ***
(0.003) (0.003)
Fraction of Total Employment Affected -2.18% ***
(0.004)
R-Squared 0.090 0.137
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 802 802
This table reports coefﬁcient estimates for regressions on cumulative abnormal returns in the [-3, +3] day
window surrounding mass layoff announcements. Announcemnt dates are the dates which firms reported as
layoff notice dates in the WARN data and then adjusted by hand after looking up the first occurence of the
layoff news in Factset media sources. Robust standard errors in parentheses.68 
 
My  results  indicate  that  debt  maturity  structure  can  have  significant  implications  for  firms’ 
employment  decisions  when  they  face  a  credit  shock.  Firms  whose  long-term  debt  was  largely 
maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 reduced their total employment by 5.07% more than 
otherwise similar firms whose debt was due following the onset of the crisis and were 6.89% more 
likely to make a mass layoff. 
Examining the quality of layoffs, I find that financially constrained firms lay off greater portions 
of high human capital workers relative to financially unconstrained firms. These specifications rely 
on a variety of human capital proxies – salary, educational attainment, work experience and on-the-
job training. Given multiple layoff instances, I find that financially healthy firms began laying off low 
human capital workers, escalating to high human capital workers in later layoff instances. In contrast, 
financially distressed firms laid off high human capital workers in early layoff instances, deescalating 
to low human capital workers later on. The pecking order of layoffs that I observe among financially 
distressed firms contradicts labor economics theory predicting that, given a layoff event, firms will 
sort workers in inverse order of firm-specific human capital and begin laying off at the low end. 
Finally, I consider stock market reactions to mass layoff announcements. I find 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns to be slightly negative following a mass layoff announcement. In addition, I find a 
negative relationship between 3-day cumulative abnormal returns and the degree of human capital 
laid  off.  These  results  indicate  that  valuations  decline  upon  destruction  of  the  value  created  in 
worker-employer  relationships,  and  that  the  decline  is  particularly  pronounced  for  high  human 
capital relationships. 
My results contribute to the literature in a number of ways. My results point to the importance 
of maturity structure for maintenance of labor. This highlights the extra attention firm managers 
should pay to the maturity profile of their firms’ debt. Second, my results provide evidence that the 
2007  credit  crisis  had  significant  real  effects  on  labor  decisions  in  2008.  Third,  I  present  new 69 
 
evidence on human capital choices within layoff instances, which underscores the attention that firm 
managers should pay to the cost and contribution of each occupation, both in the near and long 
terms. Broadly, my findings suggest that financing constraints have a significant impact on firm-level 
employment outcomes and, in particular, on the type of human capital dismissed in layoffs induced 
by financial constraint.  
Chapter 3: Layoff Announcements, Human Capital and Stock Price Reactions71 
 
Introduction 
Given the economic climate of the last few years, many firms have undergone downsizing in an 
attempt to cut costs. As these downsizing efforts (or layoffs) are announced, the market reaction is 
often mixed. For some firms, there can be a significant negative stock price reaction on the date that 
a firm announces a layoff, yet for other firms, the market reaction can be significantly positive. This 
raises the question as to how the market perceives layoffs. Does a layoff announcement provide a 
signal about the present or future financial distress of the company, with the market reaction being 
negative? Or is the layoff viewed as a solution to an existing problem that may benefit the company, 
in which case the market reaction should be positive? These two alternatives form the basis for two 
main hypotheses that have been presented in prior research regarding the stock market reaction to 
layoff announcements. 
The financial distress hypothesis, advanced by Worrell, Davidson and Sharma (1991), is based 
on the premise that the signal provided by the layoff announcement tends to reinforce knowledge 
about the current negative financial condition of the firm. Layoffs confirm management’s view that 
the current financial problems are real and long-lasting. The financial distress hypothesis predicts a 
negative stock price reaction. An alternative hypothesis is the potential benefit hypothesis, advanced 
by Iqbal and Shetty (1995), which is based on the premise that to some extent all layoffs are an 
attempt to cut costs and improve earnings. Firms that engage in a layoff do so in an attempt to 
achieve a future benefit, including the potential for a larger increase in future profits. The layoff may 
even help the firm avoid bankruptcy. Stock price reactions are expected to be positive under the 
potential benefit hypothesis. 
This chapter addresses the conflicting results that have emerged in prior studies to address the 
financial distress and potential benefit hypotheses. It also recognizes that these two hypotheses are 
not necessarily in competition; they may explain concurrent and additive effects of the stock price 72 
 
reactions to layoff announcements. Price reactions will be a function of the economic impact of the 
layoff,  where  the  economic  impact  is  closely  linked  to  the  types  of  workers  laid  off,  i.e.  their 
occupations and degrees of human capital. 
Related Literature 
The  empirical  literature  that  has  considered  stock  price  reactions  surrounding  layoff 
announcements  has,  by  and  large,  found  the  relationship  to  be  negative.  One  straightforward 
interpretation  of  this  is  that  layoffs  signal  a  reduction  in  product  demand  relative  to  existing 
production capacity (the “reduced demand” hypothesis). Clearly, reduced demand is not the only 
factor driving layoff events. To name a few alternative scenarios, layoffs may come about as a means 
to cut costs, following a productivity gain or following a restructuring event such as a merger. In 
each case, the stock price may respond differently. Thus, studies examining stock price reactions in 
greater detail have focused on the stock price reaction relative to (1) the stated reason for the layoff 
and (2) the financial condition of the firm. These two branches are described in turn below. 
Focusing on firms’ stated reasons for the layoff events, Worrell, Davidson and Sharma (1991) 
examined 197 layoff announcements that appeared in the Wall Street Journal between 1979 and 
1987. Using mean cumulative prediction errors, they found a significant negative overall stock price 
reaction over an eleven-day period surrounding the date of the announcement. In addition, they 
found that firms that stated a layoff was due to “financial reasons” experienced significantly more 
negative  returns than  those  that stated a layoff  was due  to “restructure  or consolidation.”  The 
authors conclude that the layoff announcement was viewed as a signal that the firm’s problems were 
serious, and was thus perceived negatively by the market. These results support the financial distress 
hypothesis. 
In a related study, Iqbal and Shetty (1995) examined 187 layoff announcements that appeared in 
the Wall Street Journal between 1986 and 1989. Using cumulative average prediction errors, they 73 
 
found a significant negative overall stock price reaction over the two-day event window surrounding 
the layoff announcement date. These results are consistent with Worrell, Davidson and Sharma 
(1991).  Iqbal  and  Shetty  also  examined  differences  in  stock  price  reactions  to  the  layoff 
announcements of “financially weak” versus “financially healthy” firms, and found that financially 
weak firms had a significantly more positive stock price reactions than financially healthy firms. 
These results contradict the results of Worrell, Davidson and Sharma, who found the opposite: 
financially  weak  firms  had  more  negative  stock  price  reactions.  Iqbal  and  Shetty  attribute  their 
findings to the potential benefit hypothesis. They pointed out, however, that the measure they used 
to identify  financially  weak  firms is different  than the  measure  used  by Worrell, Davidson and 
Sharma, which could account for the difference. In addition, their sample size of financially weak 
firms (17) was small, which may contribute to the difference between the two studies.  
Consistent  with  the  potential  benefit  hypothesis,  in  a  case  study  of  restructuring  events  at 
General Dynamics in the early 1990s, Dial and Murphy (1995) found that layoff events resulted in 
efficiency improvements and value creation. While it is of course difficult to draw generalizable 
conclusions from a case study, the study fits the broad interpretation that layoffs are a signal of a 
productivity gain – management has found more efficient ways to produce using less labor. 
Under  the  financial  distress  hypothesis,  a  layoff  announcement  for  financial  reasons  is 
confirmation of bad news: a firm laying off workers for financial reasons is in a tenuous position 
that  is  bound  to  grow  worse.  Thus,  the  stock  price  reacts  negatively.  The  potential  benefit 
hypothesis, on the other hand, views a layoff announcement as potential good news: a financially 
weak firm that chooses to lay off workers is likely to do so strategically and to its benefit. Thus, the 
stock price reacts positively. An ability to distinguish between the two hypotheses would seem to 
require an additional clue: an understanding of the characteristics of the workers the firm has laid off. 
In particular, it seems important to account for these workers’ contributions to the firm and, thus, 74 
 
whether the firm can expect to be helped or hurt by their departure. Ideally, each worker’s impact 
might  be  understood  through  a  measure  of  productivity  per  worker,  such  as  sales  per  worker. 
Lacking that degree of detail, I instead rely on several proxies of human capital by occupation. The 
proxies are salary, level of educational attainment, level of work experience and level of on-the-job 
training,  and  are  specific  to  occupation.  Presumably,  earlier  studies  did  not  make  use  of  such 
information because due to a lack of data. Detail on the human capital of workers laid off should 
add to our ability to meaningfully distinguish between the financial distress and potential benefit 
hypotheses. 
Data 
This paper relies on a new, hand-collected data set on firm-level mass layoffs in California from 
2006-2011.  The  dataset  is  built  around  firm-level  mass  layoff  instances.  Since  my  analysis  also 
requires additional worker and firm characteristics, I combine the following four datasets into one: 
(1) firm-level mass layoff data available as a result of the WARN Act; (2) proxies of human capital 
by occupation (salary, educational attainment, work experience, and on-the-job training) from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); (3) quarterly and annual firm fundamentals as well as credit ratings 
from Compustat; and (4) stock price and market return data from CRSP. The final, combine dataset 
consists of 412 unique, public firms having made 824 mass layoffs in California between 2006 and 
2011. This section describes each source, data selection and variable construction.  
Firm-Level Mass Layoff Data 
Firm-level data on mass layoffs is available as a result of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification (WARN) Act,
9 passed federally in 1989. The WARN Act requires firms with more than 
100 full-time employees to provide 60-day advanced notice of impending mass layoff events, defined 
by the BLS as affecting 50 or more employees of a single company in a given location. Notice must 
be given in writing to:  (1) the employees’ representative or, if there is no representative, to each 
                                                           
9 I compiled the data from over 3,000 PDF pages of notices available to the public from the State of California’s Employment 
Development Department: http://www.edd.ca.gov/jobs_and_training/layoff_services_warn.htm. 75 
 
affected employee; (2) the state dislocated worker unit; and (3) the local government where the plant 
is located. 
Implementation of the WARN Act having been left to states, the availability of WARN data 
varies widely. Compliance with the Act, the variables collected, the time span over which they have 
been collected, as well as public access to the records, vary by state. The non-standard nature of the 
reporting makes it difficult to imagine a national dataset. Many states would be missing, there would 
be few data fields in common, and the time series would be short. As a result, I have chosen to 
focus on a single state, California. In addition to being a large economy, California has enforced 
thorough WARN reporting and has made the records relatively easily accessible. It is also the only 
state to require firms to report the occupations affected in a mass layoff, which is important to my 
analysis. Californian WARN notices require the following information: company name; address of 
layoff location; layoff date; date notice received; number of employees affected; layoff or closure; 
severance; union representation; bumping rights; and occupations of affected employees. In addition, 
California defines a mass layoff more narrowly, as affected 35 or more employees. To my knowledge, 
this research is the first to describe and analyze firm-level layoffs beyond a case study of a single firm. 
Figure 1 presents a geographic scatter plot of all mass layoff instances in California between 
2006  and  2011.  Mass  layoff  instances  are  largely  clustered  in  the  urban  areas  surrounding  San 
Francisco and Los Angeles, corresponding to the locations of most large firms, retail stores, and 
production facilities. Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of layoff instances over this period. The raw 
data consists of 4,335 layoff events among 1,274 unique public and private firms, affecting a total of 
260,100 workers. The average layoff event in this period affected 110 workers. Several major layoff 
events stand out. The largest and third largest layoff events belong to Macy’s, which laid off 2,053 
workers on September 1
st, 2006 and 1,501 workers on May 1
st, 2009. The second largest layoff event 
belongs to United Airlines, which laid off 1,549 workers on October 5
th, 2008. The fourth largest 
layoff belongs to Circuit City, which laid off 1,163 workers on March 21
st, 2009. The fifth largest 
layoff belongs to Washington Mutual, which laid off 1,153 workers on June 30
th, 2008.  76 
 
I  compared  the  WARN  series  to  both  initial  unemployment  claims  from  the  BLS  and  an 
estimate of mass layoffs derived from BLS data in order to get a sense for the completeness of the 
WARN data. Initial claims are only a partial description of layoffs in California, as not all those laid 
off apply for unemployment assistance. Nevertheless, initial claims offer a more complete picture of 
layoffs than the WARN data, as an unemployment assistance claim can be initiated by any laid off 
worker,  not  just  those  affected  by  a  mass  layoff.  I  find  that  the  WARN  data  represents 
approximately 20% of initial claims. In another attempt to assess the completeness of the WARN 
data, I estimate the minimum amount of mass layoffs in California using Mass Layoff Statistics 
(MLS) from the BLS. The MLS program does not report the number of employees affected by mass 
layoffs, but it does report the number of monthly mass layoff incidents in the state. California 
defines  a  mass  layoff  as  a  layoff  incident  affecting  at  least  35  workers.  Thus,  I  assume  that  a 
minimum of 35 workers are affected in each mass layoff incident and simply multiply the number of 
mass layoff events by 35 in order to arrive at a minimum estimate. I find that the WARN data 
represents 60% of estimated mass layoffs. This leads me to believe that some firms are simply not 
reporting mass layoff events as they are required to by state and federal law. This is unsurprising, as 
there is slight or no enforcement of the WARN Act in California. Non-reporting firms are likely to 
be less well-run administratively rather than intentionally flouting the state disclosure requirement; I 
do not believe that the omission of these firms biases the data in a predictable direction. 
Table 12 presents a tabulation of mass layoff events by industry and Table 13 tabulates the 
employers having fired the greatest numbers of workers. Financial firms (including Wells Fargo, 
Washington Mutual, Fleetwood, Indymac, Citigroup) made a large number of mass layoffs, as did 
major retail firms (including Macy’s, Mervyn’s, Circuit City, Target, JC Penney’s). The airline and 
aerospace industry (including United, American, ATA, Boeing), persistently beleaguered, cut many 
jobs as well. The mix of occupations affected in each mass layoff depends to some extent on the 
firm. For example, the WARN data reveals that aerospace engineers and flight attendants were laid 
off by United Airlines, whereas marketing managers and sales personnel were laid off by Macy’s. 77 
 
However, each mass layoff notice pertains to a variety of occupations and those occupations tend to 
be repeated among firms within the same industry. 
It is common for firms to engage in multiple rounds of mass layoffs as opposed to all at once; 
sometimes the layoff events are separated by years, sometimes merely by several weeks. Thus, firms 
behave as though WARN notice filings carry either no market signal or at least not a negative 
market signal. It may be that press releases lead the WARN announcements, in effect nullifying the 
information that they contain for financial markets. Multiple mass layoffs may be a sign of ongoing 
financial constraint. 
Constructing Proxies for Human Capital By Occupation From the BLS 
In order to construct measured of human capital by occupation, the job titles reported in the 
WARN data had to be unified by occupation. I unified WARN job titles by hand using the standard 
occupation  classification  (SOC)  system  available  from  the  BLS.  Once  WARN  job  titles  were 
matched to SOC occupations they were also linked to SOC codes, which allowed me to connect to 
other occupational data tracked by the BLS. This data is the basis of four human capital proxies: 
annual salary, educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training.  
Annual  salary  is  available  by  occupation  (840  unique  occupation  classifications)  and  by 
metropolitan statistical area (24 unique areas within California). To take an example, this allows me 
to estimate that a typical chemical engineer in the San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos area earns an 
annual  salary of $86,490. In the  absence  of a direct measure  of worker skill,  the  literature  has 
commonly used wages as a proxy. Examples include Bernard and Jensen (2002) and Dunne and 
Roberts (1990), who consider the determinants of wages and the effects of wages on plant closures 
and Carneiro and Portugal (2003), who consider the link between wages and displacement events. 
Next, SOC codes link to estimates of educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job 
training for each occupation. Occupations receive designations in three categories: 
1)  Entry-level education: doctoral/professional degree; master’s; bachelor’s; associate’s; 
postsecondary; some college; high school; less than high school 78 
 
2)  Related work experience: > 5 years; 1-5 years; < 1 year; none 
3)  On-the-job  training:  internship;  apprenticeship;  long-term  (>  1  year);  moderate  (1-12 
months); short-term (< 1 month); none 
To take an example, a typical judge has a doctoral or professional degree, more than 5 years of work 
experience and short-term on-the-job training. Layoffs in California between 2006 and 2011 are 
summarized according to these four human capital proxies in Table 14. 
A worker’s human capital can be thought of in two pieces: firm-specific and general. The proxies 
described above are each indicators of a worker’s general human capital. Ideally, I would have data 
on firm-level investment in specific skills, i.e. those that do not easily translate to other firms or 
context, by occupation. Tenure at a firm would be a rough but reasonable proxy, as firm-specific 
knowledge  naturally  increases  with  tenure.  However,  lacking  data  on  tenure  or  potential  other 
proxies, I use the four general human capital proxies as though they are representative of firm-
specific human capital and interpret the results with this caveat. 
Compustat Annual Fundamental Data 
I consider the entire universe of firms from the Compustat Annual and Quarterly Fundamental 
Files  between  2000  and 2011.  In  addition  to  balance  sheet  and  income  statement  information, 
Compustat also reports the number of workers employed by a firm. The main independent variables 
are size (represented as the log value of total assets), Tobin’s Q (proxied by the market-to-book 
ratio), cash flow, cash balance, and long-term debt normalized by total assets. Variable definitions 
and constructions are detailed in Appendix A. Finally, I use four-digit SIC codes in order to map 
each firm’s industry into Fama-French 12 and Fama-French 48 industry classifications. 
CRSP Stock Price and Market Return Data 
I use value-weighted return and market return data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) to calculate 3-day cumulative abnormal returns for each firm surrounding each layoff 
event. The CRSP data was merged using CUSIP and stock tickers. 
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Adjustments to Layoff Announcement Dates 
The  layoff  announcement  dates  reported  in  WARN  announcements  required  verification.  I 
looked  up  layoff  announcements  using  Factiva  and  Lexus  Nexus  and  recorded  the  earliest 
surrounding date on which news was reported in a major news publication, such as The Wall Street 
Journal. I relied on these verified and adjusted dates in the event study. The date adjustments are 
important to my results. 
Event Study Methodology 
The event study methodology that I rely on is widely used in the empirical corporate finance 
literature (Brown and Warner (1985), Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Fama, Fisher, Jensen and 
Roll (1969), and MacKinlay (1997)). I will, therefore, only provide a broad overview here. As many 
of these papers note, clearly defining the event date is critical and often difficult. I assume that the 
market become aware of a layoff announcement on the day it was reported in an Associated Press or 
Wall Street Journal article. It may be that the market knew of what I identify as the announced event 
at some time prior. To the extent that this is the case, my analysis will not capture the full effect of 
layoff announcements on stock prices. 
Using value-weighted return data from CRSP, cumulative average excess returns are calculated 
using a market model that regresses security returns against the overall market return to generate a 
series of abnormal returns. Let   index time in trading dates, let  indicate the “event date” (the date 
of the layoff announcement) and let   index firms. The firm daily return,    , is regressed on    , 
the value-weighted market index for date  , which is available from CRSP. This regression, 
                      , 80 
 
is estimated for a period from day        to day       .
10 Next, for days around the event date, I 
calculate the daily abnormal, or excess, return, as 
                         , 
where     is  the  actual  return  on  security   at  time  ,     and     are  the  estimated  regression 
coefficients resulting from the equation above, and              is the predicted return on security 
  at time  . The excess return represents the component of the stock return of firm   that is not 
correlated with overall market movement in the stock returns and presumably reflects unexpected 
firm-specific factors. 
The excess returns calculated for each date around a layoff announcement are used to calculate 
the cumulative excess return for each announcement. These are computed by added up the daily 
excess returns over various event windows around the date of the announcement:  
      ∑
    
 
 
    . 
The mean cumulative excess returns over various intervals,    to   , is then computed as: 
           ∑    
  
     , 
where the interval    to    represents different lengths. I report analysis based on cumulative excess 
returns computed using the one-, three- and five-day windows. In an efficient market,     and 
         will be random across time except when news affects the intrinsic value of a firm’s stock. 
If the market is efficient (Fama (1970)), its reaction to news will be immediate. To test whether news 
like a layoff announcement affects firm value, I compute a test statistic by standardizing the      by 
its estimated standard deviation,    : 
       
    
   
. 
                                                           
10 I experimented with other estimation periods, such as -100 to -70 and -100 to -50, with no meaningful effect on the 
results. 81 
 
The     is computed as the typical regression forecast error. This method specifically adjusts the 
standard deviation for the distance of the independent variable in the test period from the mean 
value in the estimation period, ensuring that same-sized prediction errors to have differing levels of 
significance for different firms due to individual variation.       is the test statistic for an individual 
company’s abnormal returns. 
The standardized mean cumulative prediction error over the interval,      , over the interval 
               is then 
        ∑ 
   
   
          √              
where               is  the  number  of  days  spanning  the  test  interval.  The  test  statistic  for   
securities is 
    ∑
     
√ 
 
    . 
Each       is assumed to be normally distributed in the absence of abnormal performance. Under 
this assumption,   is also normal.  
If the market views a layoff announcement positively, negatively or neutrally, the values of     
and          for the intervals surrounding day zero will be significant and positive, significant and 
negative, and insignificant, respectively. 
Results 
Stock Returns For All Layoff Announcements 
Table 24 summarizes mean cumulative excess returns for all layoff announcements over varying 
time intervals: -90 to +90, -30 to +30, -5 to +5, -3 to +3 and -1 to +1 day(s). The first row explores 
all  layoff  announcements.  In  agreement  with  the  results  in  related  studies,  I  find  the  mean 
cumulative excess returns to be negative following layoff announcements. The results are highly 82 
 
significant in the -5 to +5 day and -3 to +3 day intervals, mildly significant in the -1 to +1 day 
interval and insignificant in the -90 to +90 day and -30 to +30 day intervals. This is evidence that a 
significant negative stock market reaction is associated with layoff announcements and confined to 
the days immediately surrounding the layoff announcements. 
Table 24: Mean Cumulative Excess Returns 
 
Variables -90 to +90 -30 to +30 -5 to +5 -3 to +3 -1 to +1
All layoff announcements -0.0199 -0.0215 -0.0142 -0.0045 -0.0041
-(0.49) -(0.96) -(3.51) -(2.83) -(1.70)
Degree of human capital
Salary
   High -0.0563 -0.0481 -0.0246 -0.0081 -0.0079
-(0.74) -(0.24) -(3.85) -(3.51) -(1.66)
   Low -0.0034 -0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0004
-(0.72) -(0.81) -(0.12) -(0.45) -(0.33)
Education
   High -0.0617 -0.0298 -0.0093 -0.0117 -0.0083
-(0.33) -(0.62) -(3.30) -(3.24) -(1.89)
   Low -0.0112 -0.0082 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0007
-(0.94) -(0.59) -(0.22) -(0.75) -(0.50)
Work experience
   High -0.0334 -0.0197 -0.0136 -0.0227 -0.0119
-(0.55) -(0.40) -(1.88) -(1.92) -(1.42)
   Low -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0001
-(0.63) -(0.55) -(0.29) -(0.15) -(0.36)
On-the-job training
   High -0.046 -0.0177 -0.0148 -0.0083 -0.0066
-(0.19) -(0.15) -(1.99) -(1.75) -(1.30)
   Low -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0006
-(0.25) -(0.34) -(0.17) -(0.13) -(0.09)
Percentage of employees affected
   More than 5 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.021 -0.0077 -0.0026
-(0.85) -(0.85) -(2.27) -(2.78) -(0.78)
   Less than 5 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0034 -0.0014 -0.0012
-(0.88) -(0.67) -(2.33) -(2.24) -(0.25)
Days
This table presents mean cumulative excess returns over various time intervals. I first calculate excess returns for
each date around a layoff announcement and next calculate the cumulative excess returns for each announcement
by adding up the daily excess returns over various event windows. Standard errors are in parentheses.83 
 
Stock Returns By Degree of Human Capital 
The four middle rows of Table 24 examine stock price reactions to layoff announcements by the 
degree of human capital of the employees affected. I rely on the four proxies of human capital 
described above: salary, educational attainment, work experience and on-the-job training. For each 
proxy, I designate the top quartile the high human capital segment and the bottom quartile the low 
human capital segment and calculate mean cumulative excess returns over the chosen time intervals. 
Whereas mean cumulative excess returns were found to be negative when examined across all 
layoff announcements, I find that negative excess returns appear to be driven by high human capital 
layoffs. That is, mean cumulative excess returns are significantly negative over the -5 to +5 day, -3 to 
+3 day and -1 to +1 day intervals for high human capital layoffs but not for low human capital 
layoffs. For low human capital layoffs, mean cumulative excess returns are very slightly negative but 
insignificant. The results are strongest using salary as a proxy for human capital but hold with mild 
significance for the other human capital proxies as well. The returns tend to be negative and highly 
significant a for the -5 to +5 day and -3 to +3 day intervals and mildly significant for the -1 to +1 
day intervals, indicating that a three-day window may be too narrow to pick up the effects of the 
layoff  announcements.  Figure  3  presents  a  plot  of  cumulative  excess  returns  relative  to  layoff 
announcement dates (measured as WARN layoff notice dates). 
Stock Returns By Layoff Size 
To study the effects of the size of a mass layoff announcement, I categorized layoffs into two 
sizes: layoffs of more than 5 percent of the firm’s total labor and layoff of less than 5 percent of the 
firm’s total labor. For layoff announcements of 5 percent or more, the mean cumulative excess 
return is -0.021 from day -5 to day +5 and -0.0077 from day -3 to day +3. For layoff announcements 
of 5 percent or less, the mean cumulative excess return is -0.0034 from day -5 to day +5 and -0.0014 
from day -3 to day +3. While the mean cumulative excess returns are negative in all cases, the 
magnitudes are substantially less for smaller layoff announcements. 84 
 
Figure 3: Mean Cumulative Excess Returns Relative to Layoff Announcement Dates 
 
Conclusion 
This exploratory event study has found evidence in agreement with previous studies: investors 
tend to respond negatively to firm-level layoff announcements. In addition, it goes a step further by 
making use of new data on the occupations of workers affected in a given layoff instance. The 
occupations of workers affected turns out to matter crucially. I find that investors tend to respond 
negatively to firm-level layoff announcements when I consider all announcements at once but, when 
layoffs are separated into high human capital versus low human capital categories, the negative 
relationship is only present among high human capital layoffs. The reactions continue to be negative 
among low human capital layoff announcements but these results are insignificant. 
This nuance goes some way in helping to understand the two main hypotheses regard stock 
price reactions to layoff announcements: the financial distress hypothesis and the potential benefit 
hypothesis. Under the financial distress hypothesis, a layoff announcement for financial reasons is 
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confirmation of bad news: a firm laying off workers for financial reasons is in a tenuous position 
that  is  bound  to  grow  worse.  Thus,  the  stock  price  reacts  negatively.  The  potential  benefit 
hypothesis, on the other hand, views a layoff announcement as potential good news: a financially 
weak firm that chooses to lay off workers is likely to do so strategically and to its benefit. Thus, the 
stock price reacts positively.  
Considering the full set of layoff announcements, the stock price reaction is negative, which 
would appear to support the financial distress narrative. However, conditioning on the degree of 
human capital, the negative stock price reaction holds in the event of high human capital layoffs but 
not in the event of low human capital layoffs. Is this consistent, instead, with the potential benefit 
hypothesis? Perhaps another way of considering the potential benefit hypothesis is the notion that 
some layoffs are more likely to imply a potential benefit whereas others are more likely to imply 
potential harm. High human capital layoffs are more likely to be harmful, as it will be more difficult 
for a firm to re-hire and re-train higher human capital workers. A negative stock price reaction given 
high human capital layoffs seems to support a version of the potential benefit hypothesis or, more 
aptly, a hypothesis that might more aptly be labeled the “potential harm” hypothesis. The potential 
benefit and potential harm hypotheses are not contradictory. It is most likely the case that the 
elimination of low human capital workers, as opposed to high human capital workers, will benefit a 
firm. 
While previous studies have found clear evidence that the distribution of stock market reactions 
is negative, I find evidence that the relationship between announcements and stock price reactions 
depends  on  the  occupations  of  the  workers  laid  off.  In  particular,  the  negative  relationship  is 
particular to layoffs of high human capital workers. 
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Appendix  
This  section documents  the  definitions of the  variables used  in  the  empirical  analysis.  Variable 
names in parentheses are from the Compustat Annual Fundamental files, unless noted. 
i.  Market-to-book: total book value of assets (AT) plus the market value of equity 
(AT+CSHO*PRCC_F) minus the book value of equity deferred taxes (CEQ+TXDB), 
all over total assets (AT*0.9) plus the market value of assets (MKVALT*0.1) 
 
ii.  Long-term leverage: total debt (DLTT+DLC+DCLO) divided by total assets (AT) 
iii.  Profitability: EBITDA (OIBDP) divided by beginning-of-period total assets (AT) 
iv.  Interest coverage: operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by interest 
and related expenses (XINT) 
 
v.  Liquidity: net income (IB) plus depreciation and amortization (DP) over the lag of 
property, plant and equipment (PPENT) 
 
vi.  Investment-to-capital: capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by the lag of property, 
plant and equipment (PPENT) 
 
vii.  Size: natural log of total assets (AT) 
viii.  Sales: net sales (SALE) 
ix.  Cash flow: net income (IB) plus depreciation and amortization (DP) over the lag of 
property, plant and equipment (PPENT) 
 
x.  Cash balance: the ratio of cash and short-term investments (CHE) to total assets (AT) 
xi.  Dividends: common dividend (DVC) plus preferred dividend (DVP) over lagged total 
assets (AT) 
 
xii.  KZ Index: index of financial constraint, calculated following Lamont, Polk, and Saa-
Requejo (2001) as follows: 
 
           
                                                               
                                                                    
xiii.  Investment: capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by the lag of property, plant and 
equipment (PPENT) 
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xiv.  % ∆ investment: percentage change in investment from       to   
xv.  % ∆ employment: percentage change in the number of employees (EMP) from       
to   
 
xvi.  % ∆ capital expenditure: percentage change in capital expenditure (CAPX) from       
to   
 
The following variables were pulled from the Compustat Industry file: 
xvii.  RTCRENT: Contingent rental expense 
xviii.  RTLCS: Comparable sales (%) 
xix.  RTLNSC: Number of stores closed during period 
xx.  RTLNSE: Numbers of stores at period end 
xxi.  RTLNSO: Number of stores opened during period 
xxii.  RTMRENT: Minimum rental expense 
xxiii.  RTNSSF: Net sales per retail square foot 
xxiv.  RTORENT: Other rental expense 
xxv.  RTTSF: Total retail square footage 
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Table A1: Compustat Sample Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of firms in fiscal year 2007 9,395
Drop firms with:
SIC 6000s -2,008
SIC 8000s -191
SIC 9000s -28
Total employees < 500 -3,456
Total assets < $100 million -90
Negative sales -1
Missing sales -410
Cash greater than assets 0
PPE greater than assets -1
Total debt (DD1+DLTT) greater than assets -95
Missing DD1 or missing DLTT -1
Notes payable over assets > 1% -842
DLTT < (DD2+DD3+DD4+DD5) -524
Fiscal year end months 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 -278
DLTT / assets > 5% -469
Missing outcome and control variables -157
Number of firms after sample selection screens 844
The sample consists of all firms in the Compustat Annual and Quarterly Fundamentals Files in 2007.
Following Almeida et al. (2012) as well as Almeida, Compello and Weisback (2004) and Frank and
Goyal (2003) before them, I apply the following screens. Additionally, I remove small firms (those with
fewer than 500 employees), following Benmelech, Bergman and Seru (2011). This reduces an inital
sample of 9,395 firms with Compustat data to a final sample of 844 firms with Compustat data.89 
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